The default Event.notifies body was hand-rolling a tag scan for lowercase
`p`, duplicating the tag-shape knowledge that already lives in PTag.
Give PTag ownership of the check:
PTag.isNotifying(tags, userHex) // iterates tags and uses PTag.isTagged
Event.notifies now delegates to it. Kinds that override (CommentEvent,
WakeUpEvent) still work — they compose or replace the default as before.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01GQDJxiHPogdzCNhUBN7Pjc
The notification pipeline previously hard-coded a lowercase-`p`-tag match
in two places (the observer predicate and consumeFromCache via
taggedUserIds). That's correct for most kinds but wrong for two:
- NIP-22 CommentEvent: a comment several levels deep only tags the root
author via uppercase `P` (RootAuthorTag). Pure lowercase-p routing
missed "someone replied deep in your thread" notifications.
- Experimental WakeUpEvent (kind 23903): its `p` tags are the authors of
the subject events it references — Bob reacting to Alice's post yields
a WakeUpEvent with p=Bob, even though Alice's device is the one that
needs to wake up. Transport-layer routing (push/relay subscription)
already delivered the event to the right device, so the in-event
routing has to be permissive.
Introduce `open fun Event.notifies(userHex: HexKey): Boolean` with a
lowercase-`p` default that covers NIP-01/04/17/25/28/34/57/68/71/84/AC/
chess/wiki/long-form/poll mentions. Each kind with distinct semantics
overrides:
- CommentEvent.notifies: super.notifies(u) || rootAuthorKeys().contains(u)
— picks up uppercase P root-author routing on top of lowercase p.
- WakeUpEvent.notifies: true — every logged-in account is a valid wake
target once the event has reached LocalCache on this device.
NotificationDispatcher's observer predicate and EventNotificationConsumer.
consumeFromCache both now ask `event.notifies(accountHex)` instead of
extracting taggedUserIds themselves. The zap path's redundant
isTaggedUser re-check is gone too (it was duplicating what the outer
routing already enforced).
https://claude.ai/code/session_01GQDJxiHPogdzCNhUBN7Pjc
A previous commit misread the spec: p-tags on a WakeUp identify the
AUTHORS of the referenced events (the people whose events are the
subject of the wake-up), not the recipients. The consumer's existing
npub-in-p-tag match is therefore correct — "is this logged-in account
the author of a referenced event?".
- Revert WakeUpEvent.build() back to notify(about.toPTag()) and replace
the comment with a spec-accurate one.
- In wakeUpFor, source author pubkeys from event.authorKeys() (p-tags,
canonical) first, merge in the e-tag author hints, and fall back to
the WakeUp signer only when both are empty. Bound by MAX_WAKEUP_REFS.
computeReplyTo and the referenced-event fetch path remain untouched —
those fixes are orthogonal to the p-tag semantic.
The WakeUp notification path had three latent bugs that caused pushed
WakeUps to silently not deliver anything to the user:
- WakeUpEvent.build() tagged the about event's AUTHOR as the recipient
(via EventHintBundle.toPTag()), so a WakeUp about a zap from Alice to
Bob would p-tag Alice. The consumer matches recipients by p-tag, so
Bob — the intended recipient — was filtered out. Forward the about
event's audience (its own p-tags) instead.
- wakeUpFor() passed the WakeUp's own note to EventFinderQueryState. The
finder's filterMissingEvents only queries for the note itself (already
in cache) or its replyTo (empty because computeReplyTo had no WakeUp
case). The referenced events were never REQ'd on relays. Link the
referenced events via computeReplyTo and subscribe the finder on each
referenced note directly so filterMissingEvents picks them up.
- UserFinder was subscribed against the WakeUp's own pubKey (typically a
push bot), not the author of the event the notification is about.
Pull author pubkeys from the e-tag author hint, falling back to the
WakeUp signer only when the hint is absent.
Also: bound e-tag count per WakeUp to 16 to prevent subscription
flooding, log the 30s timeout, extract WAKEUP_WINDOW_MS constant, drop
the now-unused Note parameter from wakeUpFor.
The existing testReaddAfterRemove_RejoinerCanEncryptAndDecrypt in
MlsGroupLifecycleTest exercises the MLS layer (two raw MlsGroup
instances, admin kicks peer, fresh KP, rejoin). Nothing covered the
same flow one level up at the MlsGroupManager layer, where the
persistent state store, retained-epoch wipe, and Welcome routing for
the same nostrGroupId actually live.
Adds testLeaveAndRejoin_SameGroupIdEndToEnd: two MlsGroupManager
instances (Alice + Bob) with separate InMemoryGroupStateStores go
through the full cycle — Alice creates with a MarmotGroupData
extension, Bob joins via Welcome, bidirectional message round-trip,
Bob calls manager.leaveGroup (asserts store + retained epochs both
wiped), Alice removes Bob's leaf, Bob's second KeyPackage is admin-
added, Bob processes the second Welcome under the same nostrGroupId,
and bidirectional round-trip works again at the new epoch.
Closes the "MarmotManager.leaveGroup + rejoin" and "persistent-store
leave + fresh Welcome for same nostrGroupId" gaps from the review.
Documents inline why Alice drives the eviction commit directly: the
standalone-proposal ingestion pipeline (MarmotInboundProcessor) is a
separate, still-unimplemented concern.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Unm6uLHGLj9UcBY7hWfJVW
KeyPackageFetcher.fetchKeyPackage used client.fetchFirst, which closes
the subscription on the first event a relay sends. For kind:443
(KeyPackage) that's wrong after a rotation: the publisher does not
replace the prior event (kind:443 is not addressable), so relays may
still hold the old KP and whichever one wins the race gets returned.
Switch to fetchAll — drain every matching event until EOSE, then pick
the one with the highest created_at. Keeps freshly-rotated bundles
reachable and matches whitenoise/mdk semantics.
Unskips interop test 16 (wn rotates, amy discovers). The inverse path
(test 13) already worked because `wn keys check` looks up via the
addressable kind:10051 index instead of kind:443 directly.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Unm6uLHGLj9UcBY7hWfJVW
Gives users a last-resort "nuclear" option when Marmot local state is
corrupted or otherwise unrecoverable — wipes every MLS group, retained
epoch secret, persisted KeyPackage bundle, subscription and in-memory
chatroom for the current account. Does not broadcast leave/SelfRemove
commits, since a graceful teardown may be impossible in exactly the
scenarios where users reach for this option. The KeyPackage is
republished lazily on the next sync so the account stays reachable.
Adds clearAllState() helpers on MlsGroupManager and
KeyPackageRotationManager, a resetAllState() orchestrator on
MarmotManager, an Account.resetMarmotState() entry point, and a
destructive row + confirm dialog in the AllSettingsScreen Danger Zone
that mirrors the existing Request-to-Vanish pattern.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Unm6uLHGLj9UcBY7hWfJVW
`MarmotInboundProcessor.processGroupEvent` added every event id to its
dedup set regardless of result, including `UndecryptableOuterLayer`. The
handler buffers those events for a post-commit retry, but the replay hit
the Duplicate early-return and skipped MLS decryption — so future-epoch
messages and group-metadata commits that arrived before their epoch's
commit were silently dropped until an app restart re-fetched them.
This is interop test 12 (offline catch-up): messages 6-8 and the rename
commit only appeared after restarting Amethyst.
Skip the dedup write on `UndecryptableOuterLayer` so retries actually
re-attempt decrypt once the epoch advances. Memory is still bounded by
the handler's per-group pending buffer (64 events, FIFO-evicted).
The `tryDecryptWithRetainedEpoch` fallback in `MlsGroupManager.decrypt`
exists precisely to cover the interop harness's Test 12 scenario —
application messages encrypted under epoch N arriving at a receiver
that has already processed a commit advancing to N+1. The primary
path throws "Message epoch X doesn't match current epoch Y", then the
manager iterates the retained epoch window and tries each.
Two bugs kept the fallback from ever succeeding:
1. sender-data ciphertext sample length. The primary decrypt path uses
`MlsCryptoProvider.HASH_OUTPUT_LENGTH` (32 bytes, = KDF.Nh for
HKDF-SHA256, per RFC 9420 §6.3.2); the retained path was using
`AEAD_KEY_LENGTH` (16). The comment on the primary path — "Using
AEAD.Nk here made sender-data decryption fail against every
spec-compliant sender" — was the same fix just never propagated
to this branch. sender-data AEAD always failed, the try/catch
swallowed it, and the fallback returned null.
2. content plaintext was returned raw. AEAD output is a
PrivateMessageContent struct (§6.3.1):
`applicationData<V> || signature<V> || padding`.
The primary decrypt path parses this with `pmcReader.readOpaqueVarInt()`
to extract applicationData; the retained path returned the whole
struct. Callers saw a length-prefixed blob with signature + zero
padding glued on — obvious in a raw diff, invisible in a pass/fail
test that only checked "decrypted is not null".
Fix both in `tryDecryptWithRetainedEpoch`. Existing quartz↔quartz
tests still pass because they don't exercise out-of-order decrypt —
this branch was effectively dead code before.
Add testDecryptRetainedEpoch_ApplicationMessageAfterCommit as a
regression: Bob encrypts at epoch N, Alice advances to N+1 via
add-member, Bob's epoch-N message then arrives at Alice — must round-
trip through the retained-epoch fallback and match the original
plaintext exactly.
Interop Test 06 (wn removes a member from a group Amethyst is in) was
failing with:
GroupEventHandler.add: ERROR Failed to apply commit:
UpdatePath node count (1) doesn't match direct path length (2)
Repro scenario: 3-member group [B=leaf 0, C=leaf 1, A=leaf 2]; B (admin,
committer) removes C. After the Remove proposal applies, leaf 1 is
blank but leaf 2 (A) is still occupied — so leaf_count stays at 3 per
RFC 9420 §7.8 and the sender's direct path has length 2 ([node 1,
root]).
Per RFC 9420 §4.1.2 and §7.9 the **filtered direct path** drops any
parent node whose child on the copath has an empty resolution:
encrypting to such a parent is equivalent to encrypting to its only
non-blank child, which is already on the direct path. In our scenario
the parent at level 1 (parent of leaves 0, 1) has a blank leaf 1 on
the copath — empty resolution — so it's filtered out. Filtered
direct path length is 1, and that's what openmls / whitenoise-rs emit
in `UpdatePath.nodes<V>`.
Quartz was always using the unfiltered direct path on both sides
(send + receive + parent-hash chain + path-secret decrypt). That
worked for quartz↔quartz (both sides agreed), but broke the moment a
spec-correct sender (wn) sent a filtered UpdatePath into a quartz
receiver. Parent-hash chain is further affected because §7.9.2 walks
the filtered path — even if the size check passed, the hashes would
not match.
Fix it throughout:
- RatchetTree.filteredDirectPath: new helper returning parallel
(filteredDirectPath, filteredCopath) with the empty-resolution
entries dropped. Uses the existing `resolution()` helper, which
already handles unmerged_leaves per §4.1.2.
- RatchetTree.applyUpdatePath: size-check + target the FILTERED path.
- MlsGroup.commit (sender): emit one staged path node per filtered
level; encrypt path secrets using the filtered copath; patch parent
hashes into the filtered positions only.
- MlsGroup.processCommitInner (receiver): the UpdatePath node index
aligns to the filtered direct path, so the common-ancestor lookup
must find the filtered index to pick the right ciphertext + copath
resolution. Use the unfiltered index only for counting KDF steps
to the root (path_secret chain advances one step per unfiltered
level regardless of filtering — the chain is continuous; filtering
only decides which levels emit a UpdatePathNode, not how many KDF
steps separate them).
- MlsGroup.computeSenderParentHashes: walk the filtered direct path.
Map each filtered node back to its unfiltered level so the
preUpdateSiblingHashes lookup (indexed by unfiltered level) still
resolves. This makes the parent_hash chain agree with §7.9.2 and
with what openmls computes on the other side.
- MlsGroup.verifyParentHash: short-circuit on empty filtered path
rather than empty unfiltered path.
New regression test: testRemoveMiddleLeaf_ReceiverAcceptsCommit
reproduces the 3-member remove-middle scenario end-to-end within
quartz. It passed before this patch (because both sides were
unfiltered and agreed with each other), and it passes after this
patch (because both sides are now filtered and still agree) — the
compatibility win is that quartz now also agrees with
openmls/wn-produced commits of the same shape.
Also fix an unrelated script bug in marmot-interop.sh: the
discover_a_relays SQL probe was falsely reporting "wn has NO cached
relay entries for A" even when welcome delivery was working, because
the query assumed users.pubkey stored as BLOB but wn stores it as
TEXT (hex) in the current schema. Accept either encoding.
`amy marmot group add` previously sent the Welcome gift wrap to the
inviter's own kind:10050 (ctx.inboxRelays()) and fetched the invitee's
KeyPackage from only the inviter's configured relays. Two users with
disjoint relay configurations could never successfully marmot each
other — the welcome landed somewhere the invitee never polled.
Mirror the Android Account.addMarmotGroupMember flow in the CLI:
- New RecipientRelayFetcher in quartz/marmot one-shot-drains a target
user's kind:10050, kind:10051 and kind:10002 from a seed relay set.
Replaceable-event semantics: newest created_at per kind wins. Guards
against relays echoing events authored by someone else.
- Context.bootstrapRelays() unions the inviter's configured relays with
AmethystDefaults (DefaultNIP65RelaySet + DefaultDMRelayList) so we can
discover strangers even when nothing overlaps with our own config.
- GroupAddMemberCommand now per-invitee: looks up their relay lists;
passes kind:10051 + kind:10002 write + bootstrap to KeyPackageFetcher;
publishes the welcome to kind:10050 (fallback to NIP-65 read, then
DefaultDMRelayList, then our outbox as belt-and-braces).
Group commits/messages (kind:445) continue to use the group's MIP-01
relay set — those were already correct. Exposes welcome_targets and
key_package_relays in the JSON output so callers can verify routing.
The bug (re-added user rejoins without a usable own_leaf, so they
can neither decrypt new group messages nor send) reproduces entirely
with two in-process MlsGroup instances — no relay or second Nostr
client needed. A pure Quartz unit test runs in seconds and catches
the regression deterministically, where the bash interop version
depended on whitenoise-rs, wnd daemons and a local relay.
- quartz: add MlsGroupLifecycleTest.testReaddAfterRemove_RejoinerCanEncryptAndDecrypt
covering create → add → round-trip → remove → re-add with a fresh
KeyPackage → round-trip again, asserting leafIndex and both
encrypt/decrypt directions on the rejoined instance.
- interop: drop test_17_readd_after_remove from the headless suite and
its registration, since the unit test supersedes it.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01JaeqZwVNLKvUUvXWRzPmRP
Two drifts surfaced as 7 failing tests on the jvmTest run:
1. MarmotGroupData CURRENT_VERSION is held at 2 for mdk-core interop
(see the const-doc block), but three tests still assumed v3:
- marmotGroupData_defaultVersionIsThree asserted the constant directly.
- marmotGroupData_roundTripWithDisappearingSecs and
buildGroupEvent_appendsExpirationTagWhenDisappearingConfigured relied
on the default version emitting the v3-only disappearing_message_secs
field, which the encoder correctly skips for v2.
Rename the first to `currentVersionIsHeldAtTwoForMdkInterop` with a
spec-cross-reference comment and an extra assertion that v3 is still
in SUPPORTED_VERSIONS. Pin version=3 explicitly in the other two so
they exercise the v3 path regardless of the interop hold-back.
2. MlsGroup.processCommit now requires a non-empty FramedContentTBS
signature on non-external commits (per RFC 9420 §6.1, introduced in
0c970945). Four pipeline tests still called the raw processCommit
overload with signature=ByteArray(0), so they all failed with
"FramedContentTBS signature missing on commit from leaf 0".
Add a `processFramedCommit` wrapper on MlsGroupManager that mirrors
MlsGroup.processFramedCommit + the retention/persistence bookkeeping
from processCommit, and switch the four tests to feed framedCommitBytes
through it. MarmotInboundProcessor is unaffected (it already has the
decoded PublicMessage fields).
All 7 originally-failing Marmot tests now pass; the 4 unrelated
NostrClient network tests remain independently flaky.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01XQNAmwn1y87GAoK94QWgyn
Two bugs in MlsGroup were blocking 12 of 209 jvmTest cases (all RFC 9420
interop vectors already passed; only our higher-level lifecycle code
diverged from the spec).
Bug A — write/read asymmetry on member commits. processCommit requires
signature + confirmation_tag as separate parameters, but CommitResult
only exposed framedCommitBytes (the full PublicMessage envelope). Tests
called processCommit(commitBytes, ..., ByteArray(0)) and immediately
hit "FramedContentTBS signature missing on commit from leaf N".
Add MlsGroup.processFramedCommit(framedCommitBytes) that unpacks the
MlsMessage(PublicMessage(Commit)) envelope, verifies membership_tag for
member senders (RFC 9420 §6.2), and delegates to processCommit. Mirrors
the unwrap MarmotInboundProcessor already does in production. Updates
the 9 affected tests to use the new entry point.
Bug B — externalJoin used the wrong HPKE info bytes. The joiner
encrypted UpdatePath path-secrets against groupContext.toTlsBytes()
(pre-mutation), but receivers HPKE-Open against the post-mutation
context (epoch+1, new tree_hash) per RFC 9420 §7.6. Result:
AEADBadTagException on every external join.
Refactor externalJoin to follow the same staging pattern as commit():
stage public keys, applyUpdatePath, patch parent_hash, replace
placeholder leaf — then compute pathEncContextBytes from the post-
mutation tree, then HPKE-encrypt path-secrets with that context.
To make the framed pipeline available to external commits as well,
introduce ExternalJoinResult exposing both commitBytes and
framedCommitBytes (PublicMessage with sender = new_member_commit, no
membership_tag). processFramedCommit resolves NEW_MEMBER_COMMIT senders
to the receiver-side leaf index using the same first-blank-or-append
algorithm as RatchetTree.addLeaf, so wire decoding doesn't need to
carry the joiner's chosen index in the empty Sender field.
After: 209/209 MLS tests pass.
Quartz:
- processWelcome now enforces hash(ratchet_tree) == GroupContext.tree_hash
and verifies the joiner-derived confirmation_tag matches GroupInfo's,
closing the gap where a tampered but-signed GroupInfo could diverge
the joiner's epoch secrets.
- externalJoin does the equivalent tree_hash check.
- Promoted constantTimeEquals to a file-level helper so the companion
object (processWelcome) can use it alongside instance methods.
Tests:
- New MlsGroupNegativeTest exercises every authenticity knob on inbound
commits: tampered confirmation_tag, bit-flipped signature, spoofed
senderLeafIndex, wrong wire_format, empty confirmation_tag, and
tampered/missing membership_tag — each must throw and leave the
receiving group's epoch unchanged (atomic-rollback regression cover).
- Fixed stale jvmAndroidTest references to the removed `selfRemove()`
helper — use `buildSelfRemoveProposalMessage()` (now Pair-returning).
Interop harness:
- Adds tests 14–16 as inverted-role scaffolding (wn drives, amy receives).
Currently recorded as SKIP with explicit notes:
14 / 15 block on filtered-direct-path UpdatePath support in
quartz's applyUpdatePath (RFC 9420 §7.7 path compression).
16 blocks on a createdAt-sorted KeyPackage fetch path — the current
fetchFirst-based fetcher is non-deterministic on relay order.
Preserves the test functions so they start running the moment those
gaps are closed.
- Verify FramedContentTBS signature on inbound commits using the
sender's pre-commit leaf signature key (rejects forged commits
under a compromised exporter key).
- Verify membership_tag on inbound PublicMessage commits before
advancing state.
- Check LeafNode lifetime bounds (notBefore..notAfter) on UpdatePath.
- Require confirmation_tag to be non-empty.
- Thread wire_format into buildCommitFramedContentTbs so signature
verification reproduces the bytes the sender signed.
- Snapshot RatchetTree + groupContext + epochSecrets + initSecret +
secretTree + interimTranscriptHash + pendingProposals + sentKeys
at the top of processCommit, and restore on any throwable so a
verification failure mid-apply can't leave the group diverged.
13/13 passing; the System.err.println trace in
processPrivateMessage/applyCommit that we added to diagnose the
wire_format / admin / SelfRemove-proposal bugs is no longer needed.
Logging via the existing Log.d("MarmotDbg") calls is preserved.
https://claude.ai/code/session_1469d7f4-bb66-4ffa-a44d-1dfa4b526484
Reverts the SelfRemove-as-commit approach. openmls rejects a
commit whose only proposal is a SelfRemove from the committer with
RequiredPathNotFound — the spec model is that the removing member
publishes a STANDALONE proposal, and an admin receiver
(wn's mdk auto-commit path) folds it into their next commit.
Add `MlsGroup.buildSelfRemoveProposalMessage()` which frames
Proposal.SelfRemove as `MlsMessage(PublicMessage{proposal})` with
the proper FramedContent / signature / membership_tag and returns
the ready-to-publish bytes + the pre-commit exporter key for outer
encryption. Rewire `MlsGroupManager.leaveGroup` and
`MarmotManager.leaveGroup` to use it.
Target: test 11 (amy leave → B auto-commits SelfRemove →
removes amy from member list).
https://claude.ai/code/session_1469d7f4-bb66-4ffa-a44d-1dfa4b526484
SelfRemove is standardized in draft-ietf-mls-extensions with
IANA-registered proposal type 0x000A. openmls and mdk encode it
that way on the wire. Quartz was writing 0xF001 (Marmot private-use
range), so mdk's strict tls_codec read 0x000A for a known proposal
type it didn't recognize and the decoder drifted past the variant
body, surfacing later as
Tls(DecodingError("Trying to decode Option<T> with 64 for option..."))
when it reached `Commit.path` with misaligned bytes.
Fixes test 11 (amy leave → B still sees A as member).
https://claude.ai/code/session_1469d7f4-bb66-4ffa-a44d-1dfa4b526484
Quartz's leaveGroup was returning `proposal.toTlsBytes()` and
publishing that raw on kind:445. That's not a valid MLS message
— it's just the proposal struct with no FramedContent / MlsMessage
framing — and even if it parsed, mdk/openmls would only STAGE the
proposal. The target never actually leaves the tree until someone
commits with that proposal.
MIP-03 explicitly allows non-admins to commit a SelfRemove-only
commit, so amy can produce a proper committable kind:445 herself
after the self-demote. Replace `selfRemove()` (returned raw bytes)
with `selfRemoveCommit()` which adds the proposal to the pending
set and runs the standard `commit()` path. Plumb the resulting
CommitResult through MarmotManager.leaveGroup so the outer
encryption uses `preCommitExporterSecret` (the epoch we're
leaving, which is the one every existing member still has).
This finally propagates amy's leave to B in test 11.
https://claude.ai/code/session_1469d7f4-bb66-4ffa-a44d-1dfa4b526484
PrivateMessage commits apply their Commit body inline inside
`MlsGroup.decrypt`, so the epoch advance + extension replace
happen in `MlsGroupManager.decrypt` — not in `processCommit`.
The old `decrypt` path never called `persistGroup`, so amy's
in-memory promotion (e.g. test 08 "B promotes A") looked correct
for the current CLI invocation but the NEXT `amy marmot …` command
reloaded the pre-commit extensions from disk and refused the
follow-up rename with "MIP-01: only admins may update group
extensions".
Detect epoch advance + COMMIT result inside `decrypt`, then push
the pre-commit exporter into the retained-epoch window and persist
the group so CLI reloads see the post-commit state.
https://claude.ai/code/session_1469d7f4-bb66-4ffa-a44d-1dfa4b526484
RFC 9420 §8.2 says ConfirmedTranscriptHashInput carries the
wire_format of the AuthenticatedContent being committed, not a
hard-coded value. openmls/mdk pass mls_content.wire_format()
through, so B's PrivateMessage commits use wire_format=2 in their
transcript-hash input. Quartz always wrote wire_format=1
(PublicMessage), so amy's receiver-side new_confirmed_transcript_hash
diverged from B's — and every tag derived from it
(confirmation_key, confirmation_tag, epoch secrets) diverged too,
surfacing as "Confirmation tag verification failed" once my
error-surfacing fix stopped hiding it.
Plumb the real wire format through processCommit and its decrypt()
dispatch so PrivateMessage commits from B are hashed as
PrivateMessage on amy's side.
https://claude.ai/code/session_1469d7f4-bb66-4ffa-a44d-1dfa4b526484
`MlsGroupManager.decrypt` used to swallow the current-epoch exception
via `decryptOrNull`, try retained epochs, then retry `group.decrypt`.
After our inline-processCommit change this means a mid-commit throw
leaves the group half-advanced, and the retry then reports a
misleading "Message epoch N doesn't match current epoch N+1" —
masking the real cause (unable-to-decrypt path, path-mismatch, etc.).
Swap the order: call `group.decrypt` directly first, capture any
exception, fall through to retained epochs, and re-raise the original
exception if every epoch fails. Retains same semantics for messages
that DO decrypt on the first try.
https://claude.ai/code/session_1469d7f4-bb66-4ffa-a44d-1dfa4b526484
Tracing which path B→A commits take (processPrivateMessage vs
applyCommit) and why past-epoch PrivateMessage events surface
as Failure instead of Duplicate in tests 07/08/11/12. Will be
reverted once diagnosis is complete.
https://claude.ai/code/session_1469d7f4-bb66-4ffa-a44d-1dfa4b526484
Extend the past-epoch dedup check to PrivateMessage commits too.
Previously only the PublicMessage branch returned
`GroupEventResult.Duplicate` for a stale commit echo; the PrivateMessage
branch called `groupManager.decrypt()` directly, which consumed a
generation on the sender's ratchet and then failed with
`Message epoch X doesn't match current epoch Y` — polluting the harness
log and (worse) burning the real commit's generation slot.
Peek the epoch from the parsed PrivateMessage before touching the
secret tree: past-epoch → Duplicate, future-epoch → Error, same-epoch
falls through to the existing decrypt-and-dispatch path.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
MDK-core (openmls) defaults group configuration to
`MIXED_CIPHERTEXT_WIRE_FORMAT_POLICY` — outgoing commits / proposals
ship as PrivateMessage. Quartz only handled PrivateMessage for
ContentType.APPLICATION; any handshake message came in via the
application ratchet, consumed the first application generation on
whatever sender sent an app message next, and then died with
`Generation 0 already consumed` the moment the receiver saw the real
PrivateMessage commit. That's why every A-side processing of B's
rename / promote / remove / leave commit timed out.
Fix:
1. SecretTree grows a parallel `handshakeKeyNonceForGeneration`
path, using the per-sender `handshakeSecret` / `handshakeGeneration`
the struct already tracked — with its own skipped-keys cache and
replay-detection set so handshake and application generations
never clash.
2. `MlsGroup.decrypt()` dispatches on the PrivateMessage's
`content_type` BEFORE consuming any ratchet — COMMIT and PROPOSAL
take the handshake path; APPLICATION stays on the existing
application path.
3. COMMIT bodies decode as `Commit || signature<V> || confirmation_tag<V>
|| padding` (RFC 9420 §6.3.1) and route into `processCommit` inline,
so the caller just sees the epoch advance — no new public API.
PROPOSAL still rejects (standalone proposals aren't used by
Marmot flows yet) with a clear message instead of a cryptic
generation-consumed error.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
For a GroupContextExtensions commit, openmls signs the
`FramedContentTBS` over `group.public_group.group_context()` — the
UNMUTATED context, before the `diff` applies the GCE proposal. The
post-proposal extensions only make it into the HPKE path-encryption
context and the subsequent key schedule, not into the TBS / signature /
membership_tag.
Quartz's `applyProposal` handler for `GroupContextExtensions` mutates
`groupContext.extensions` inline — by the time `commit()` captured
`preCommitContextBytes`, the extensions were already updated. The
signature and membership_tag were then minted over the post-GCE context,
and openmls's `verify_membership` recomputed the MAC over the pre-GCE
context and reported `ValidationError(InvalidMembershipTag)` on every
cross-impl rename / promote / demote / leave.
Fix: snapshot `groupContext.extensions` before any proposal is applied,
and rebuild `preCommitContextBytes` with those original extensions. The
path-encryption context and post-commit key schedule still use the
updated extensions, matching openmls.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
RFC 9420 §7.8: the ratchet tree has no trailing blank leaves — when a
Remove blanks the rightmost leaf, everyone MUST shrink `leaf_count` and
drop the (now-orphaned) parent nodes so future `direct_path`,
`resolution`, and `treeHash` computations see the new shape.
Quartz was blanking the leaf and its direct path but leaving
`_leafCount` untouched. Openmls / mdk shrink, so after
e.g. `amy removes C (leaf 2)` quartz still had `leafCount = 3` while
B's openmls had `leafCount = 2`. Amy's `direct_path` from leaf 0 then
had two entries (to the 3-leaf-tree root), but B's tree layout expected
one — and openmls rejected the commit with
`UpdatePathError(PathLengthMismatch)`.
Fix: after blanking the leaf + direct path, walk `leafCount` down past
any trailing blanks and truncate the `nodes` list to `nodeCount(leafCount)`.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
RFC 9420 §9.2: `commit_secret = DeriveSecret(path_secret_at_root, "path")`.
Openmls / mdk implement this exactly — after deriving the ratchet-tree's
own path_secrets up to (and including) the root, they advance one more
step and use THAT as the commit_secret contribution to the new epoch's
key schedule.
Quartz was using the root's own path_secret as commit_secret on both
the encryption side (MlsGroup.commit) and the decryption side
(MlsGroup.processCommit), plus in externalJoin's commit construction.
Internally consistent, so quartz↔quartz worked; but every cross-impl
commit (quartz→openmls or openmls→quartz) derived a different
epoch_secret, cascaded into a different confirmation_key, and failed at
`InvalidCommit(ConfirmationTagMismatch)` — the blocker behind every
test that actually needed an openmls peer to accept a quartz-produced
commit or vice-versa once the UpdatePath-layer bugs were out of the way.
Fix: add one `DeriveSecret(pathSecrets.last().pathSecret, "path")` step
on the sender side, and one extra `DeriveSecret(..., "path")` past the
root on the receiver side, mirroring openmls's `ParentNode::derive_path`
loop post-condition.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
RFC 9420 §8.2: the confirmed_transcript_hash for a Commit is taken over
`wire_format || FramedContent || signature` — where `signature` is the
real `FramedContentAuthData.signature`, not an empty placeholder.
Quartz was hashing over a zero-length signature, so the committer and
every receiver baked DIFFERENT `confirmed_transcript_hash` bytes into
their new GroupContext. The committer's confirmation_tag — MAC'd over
that value — never matched the receiver's recomputation, and openmls
rejected the commit with `InvalidCommit(ConfirmationTagMismatch)`.
Fix restructures the commit flow so the FramedContentTBS is built and
signed BEFORE the transcript hash update:
1. extract `buildCommitFramedContentTbs()` as a shared helper
2. in `MlsGroup.commit()`, sign the TBS immediately after building
the commit, then pass that signature to
`buildConfirmedTranscriptHashInput(..., signature)`
3. thread the signature through `framePublicMessageCommit` as a
parameter (callers already have it) instead of re-signing inside
`processCommit` also takes the signature and forwards it to
`buildConfirmedTranscriptHashInput`; `MarmotInboundProcessor.applyCommit`
pulls `pubMsg.signature` out of the `PublicMessage` envelope and passes
it through `MlsGroupManager.processCommit`.
Also switches `RatchetTree.derivePathSecrets` from a custom
`expandWithLabel(nodeSecret, "hpke", ...)` derivation to HPKE's standard
`DeriveKeyPair(node_secret)` (RFC 9180 §7.1.3). Without this, the
receiver derives parent-node public keys that don't match the ones
quartz baked into `UpdatePathNode.encryption_key`, which manifested as
`UpdatePathError(PathMismatch)` once the HPKE context fix landed.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
RFC 9420 §7.6 / openmls `compute_path`: after applying the Commit's
proposals and the committer's UpdatePath locally, the committer must
bump the epoch and recompute tree_hash, THEN serialize the GroupContext
(with the still-pre-commit confirmed_transcript_hash) and use those
bytes as the HPKE info for encrypting every path secret. Receivers
perform the exact same recomputation on their copy of the tree before
decrypting, so the AEAD keys line up.
Quartz was using the fully pre-commit GroupContext on both sides. Self-
consistent (quartz→quartz passed), but openmls/mdk re-derives the AEAD
key from the post-mutation context and the tag check fails, which
surfaced as `InvalidCommit(UpdatePathError(UnableToDecrypt))` on every
commit-produced-by-quartz that an openmls peer had to process (add,
rename, remove, leave, promote, catchup).
Fix restructures `MlsGroup.commit()` into stage→apply→encrypt:
1. derive path-secret keypairs, stage UpdatePath entries with public
keys only
2. apply the staged path, patch parent_hashes, swap in the new leaf
3. serialize an intermediate GroupContext (new epoch + new tree_hash,
old confirmed_transcript_hash) and HPKE-encrypt each copath
resolution under that info
`processCommit()` mirrors the change on the decryption side, and also
splits the proposal loop so Add proposals apply after non-Adds (matching
the committer's order and unblocking the new-leaf-exclusion filter for
the decryption resolution lookup).
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
RFC 9420 §12.4.1: when a Commit contains Add proposals, the committer
MUST exclude the new leaves from the copath-resolution used for path-
secret encryption. Joiners get the group state via the Welcome at epoch
N+1; they neither need nor expect a path secret for epoch N.
Quartz was including them. openmls (via mdk-core) then runs its own
resolution-minus-exclusion-list when picking which ciphertext to
decrypt, so its `resolution_position` landed one slot off from where
quartz had put the ciphertext for the existing member. The AEAD tag
naturally mismatched and the commit died with
`InvalidCommit(UpdatePathError(UnableToDecrypt))` — the blocker behind
every test that needs an existing openmls member to process a commit
produced by quartz (add, rename, remove, leave, promote, catchup).
Fix: in `MlsGroup.commit()`, capture `newLeafIndices` from the Add
proposals applied in this epoch and `filterNot` them out of every
copath node's resolution before HPKE-encrypting the path secret.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
Phase 2 of the Clubhouse/nests integration: when the live-activity
channel screen is opened on a kind 30312 MeetingSpaceEvent, render an
audio-room "stage" above the chat that shows host/speaker/audience
avatars and exposes hand-raise + mute toggles backed by NIP-53 kind
10312 presence events.
Quartz:
- New MutedTag (`["muted","1"|"0"]`) and `muted()` builder helper for
MeetingRoomPresenceEvent.
- New MeetingRoomPresenceEvent.build() overload that accepts a 30312
MeetingSpaceEvent root (matching the existing 30313 overload) and
optionally encodes hand-raise + mute flags in one call.
Amethyst:
- AudioRoomStage composable: filters participants from the 30312 event
into hosts / speakers / audience, renders avatars, and publishes
presence on enter + every 30 s while composed (on dispose it pushes
one final lowered-hand presence so peers drop us before timeout).
- ChannelView wires AudioRoomStage in next to ShowVideoStreaming; the
latter is a no-op for non-30311 events so non-audio rooms are
unaffected.
No audio is captured yet — the mic toggle is a Nostr-only signal
until Phase 3 brings the MoQ/WebTransport transport.
https://claude.ai/code/session_013nVLALALKaHVgHm9u5Cg8D
openmls (via mdk-core) strict-verifies both the FramedContentAuthData
signature and the membership_tag on every inbound PublicMessage from a
Member sender (RFC 9420 §6.1, §6.2). Quartz was framing commits with
empty placeholders for both fields, so any existing member processing a
quartz-originated commit tripped `openmls::ciphersuite: Incompatible
values` (constant-time compare of a zero-length tag against the 32-byte
expected HMAC). That's the reason every interop test that requires B to
process a commit from amy (add-member, rename, remove, leave, promote,
catchup) was failing at step one.
Fix computes both fields correctly:
* capture pre-commit groupContext bytes, membership_key, and
signingPrivateKey before the key schedule / epoch advance
* build FramedContentTBS = version || wire_format || FramedContent ||
serialized_context and SignWithLabel("FramedContentTBS", ..) with
the committer's pre-commit leaf signing key
* build AuthenticatedContentTBM = TBS || signature<V> ||
confirmation_tag<V> and HMAC-SHA256 it with the pre-commit
membership_key
No change to quartz's own processCommit path (it doesn't re-verify these
fields on inbound), so this is a one-way fix for outbound to openmls
peers.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
Five protocol-level fixes and a batch of harness correctness fixes to get
the headless Marmot/Whitenoise interop harness from 1/13 to 5/13 passing
cleanly, with the remaining failures all rooted in wn's per-account
serial event-processor retry backoff (which drops undecryptable
pre-membership commits after several minutes) rather than amy behaviour.
quartz + commons
----------------
* MarmotGroupData: hold CURRENT_VERSION at 2. mdk-core (the Rust MLS
engine used by whitenoise-rs) strict-rejects v3 payloads with
`ExtensionFormatError("Trailing bytes in NostrGroupDataExtension")`
— our v3 welcomes and GCE commits never apply, so every cross-client
group flow dies at welcome processing. We still parse v3 happily on
the way in; we just don't emit it until mdk publishes the
forward-compat fix MIP-01 mandates.
* MarmotManager.updateGroupMetadata: MERGE extensions instead of
REPLACING. RFC 9420 §12.1.7 says GCE proposals blow away the old
extension list; callers that pass only [marmot_group_data] dropped
[required_capabilities], which peers then reject. Preserve every slot
except the one we're updating.
* MarmotManager.createGroup: new optional `initialMetadata` parameter
that bakes MarmotGroupData into epoch-0 GroupContext.extensions
directly. Without it, creators had to publish a pre-membership
"bootstrap" commit that no later joiner could decrypt — each such
peer then burned their retry budget on an undecryptable kind:445
before seeing the real state. Threaded through MlsGroup.create /
MlsGroupManager.createGroup.
* MarmotManager.mlsGroupIdHex: new translation helper so any code
juggling the MIP-01 nostr_group_id (what amy indexes on) and the
MLS GroupContext groupId (what mdk indexes on) can cross-reference
them without reaching into MlsGroupManager directly.
amethyst module
---------------
* Account.leaveMarmotGroup: self-demote before SelfRemove per MIP-01,
and promote a surviving member to admin first if the caller is the
sole admin (otherwise we'd throw "admin depletion"). Matches the
cli/GroupMembershipCommands.leave flow.
cli (amy)
---------
* Context.syncIncoming: don't advance `giftWrapSince` on empty polls
(so the first-ever sync doesn't bump the cursor past every
past-timestamped wrap we've ever been sent), subtract 2 days lookback
when filtering (NIP-59 randomWithTwoDays gift wraps can have any
createdAt in the last 48h), and only advance `groupSince` for groups
we actually received events for.
* Context.syncIncoming: after ingest, if any Welcome consumed a
KeyPackage, rotate and publish a fresh one immediately. MIP-00
requires this — a KP can only be welcomed once and leaving the
consumed one on relays just means later senders invite us with a
bundle we no longer have private keys for.
* Context.resolveGroupId: accept either nostr_group_id (amy's primary
key) or the MLS GroupContext groupId (what wn emits) on every verb
that takes a group id. Wired through GroupAdd/Remove/Leave/Metadata
/Read, Message send/list, and all the await* verbs so harness
scripts never have to juggle both forms for a single group.
* GroupCreateCommand: bake initial metadata into epoch 0 (see the
quartz change above). Dropped the now-redundant bootstrap commit
publish and tightened the JSON output to include `mls_group_id`.
* GroupMembershipCommands.leave: self-demote admin before SelfRemove;
promote an heir if we're the only admin, otherwise the GCE would
deplete admins and the leave aborts.
* MarmotIngest.ingestGiftWrap: unwrap the sealed-rumor layer. NIP-59
wrap is gift-wrap(kind:1059) → seal(kind:13) → rumor; the old code
only unwrapped once and then checked `inner.kind == 444`, which is
always false because inner is actually the seal. Unseal once more
before the Welcome check. This single fix is what unsticks every
amy-side Welcome ingestion.
wn harness patches + scripts
----------------------------
* whitenoise-defaults-env.patch: honour $WHITENOISE_DISCOVERY_RELAYS in
`Relay::defaults()` (release builds otherwise bake damus.io / primal
/ nos.lol into every new account's NIP-65 / Inbox / KeyPackage
lists, which breaks publishing and prevents the inbox subscription
plane from ever reaching an operational state in a sandbox).
* setup.sh: sleep 2s after amy's initial kind:30443 publish so
nostr-rs-relay has a chance to fsync before wn's first targeted
discovery query. Without it wn's `keys check` races the relay's
WAL flush and intermittently returns NotFound.
* lib.sh: peel wn's `{"result": …}` wrapper in `jq_group_id`,
`wait_for_invite`, `wait_for_message`, `wait_for_member`. Post-v0.2
wn `--json` output nests everything under `.result` (and
`groups invites[]` nests further under `.group.mls_group_id`) —
these helpers were still pattern-matching on the flat shape, so
they returned empty strings for a perfectly good response.
* tests-{create,manage,extras}.sh: track both group IDs per test
(amy's nostr + wn's MLS), pass each CLI the id it understands, and
bump the post-commit wait timeouts to 90–120s so wn's exponential
retry backoff has time to work through the pre-membership commits
it can't decrypt and get to the ones it can.
https://claude.ai/code/session_016kAxdp6ubB5CnF9URhCEzP
- MeetingRoomPresenceEvent (kind 10312) now extends BaseReplaceableEvent
instead of BaseAddressableEvent. NIP-53 states this kind is a regular
replaceable event ("presence can only be indicated in one room at a
time"), and LocalCache already routes it through consumeBaseReplaceable.
createAddress/createAddressATag/createAddressTag now take only pubKey.
- Add TagArrayBuilder extensions for streaming (30311), meeting space
(30312) and meeting room (30313) tags, plus build() helpers that assemble
the required tags per NIP-53.
- Add ProofOfAgreement utility to sign and verify the schnorr proof that
NIP-53 places in the 5th element of a participant p-tag
(SHA256 of kind:pubkey:dTag signed by the participant's private key).
Includes LiveActivitiesEvent.hasValidProof() convenience.
On the JVM, Log.d / .i / .w / .e were printing through \`println()\` which
lands on stdout. The amy CLI uses stdout as its JSON contract — any
Marmot/MLS command would restore state, emit a burst of DEBUG lines,
then emit the JSON object, and every caller piping through jq failed
to parse because the first non-empty line was a log line.
Switch to \`System.err.println\` inside PlatformLog.jvm.kt. Conventional
for CLIs (data on stdout, diagnostics on stderr), and the desktop app
already redirects as part of packaging. Callers who want everything
mixed can still \`2>&1\` at the shell level.
Fixes amy marmot group create / group add / message send etc. when
their output is captured by a shell script.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01M6dCKAF5Y1VyHGZPjzwDXq
Five extractions so the Amethyst UI and the new amy CLI share one
implementation for each piece of Marmot/identity behaviour instead of
reimplementing it per platform.
quartz additions:
- MarmotGroupData.bootstrap(..) + withMergedRelays(..): factory for the
metadata shape every inviter stamps on a fresh group and the outbox-
merge rule every admin commit carries forward.
- KeyPackageFetcher: (a) pure fetchRelaysFor union of target kind:10051,
target outbox, my outbox; (b) one-shot fetchKeyPackage; (c) publish-
side resolveKeyPackagePublishRelays.
- resolveUserHexOrNull: single entry point for npub / nprofile / 64-hex
/ NIP-05 identifiers. Uses the existing Nip19Parser + Nip05Client
infra so NIP-05 resolution is live over HTTP.
commons additions:
- MarmotManager.leafIndexOf(..): pubkey -> leaf index lookup used by
every removeMember caller.
- MarmotManager.addMember(nostrGroupId, keyPackageEvent, relays):
convenience overload that lifts the base64 decode into the manager.
- MarmotManager.buildTextMessage(..) returning a TextMessageBundle;
optionally persists the outbound inner event (CLI needs persist,
Amethyst relies on LocalCache loopback).
- MarmotIngest.ingest(event): routes kind:1059 / kind:445 through
unwrap -> processWelcome / processGroupEvent -> persist the decrypted
application message. Deliberately platform-agnostic.
Retrofits:
- Account.addMarmotGroupMember and fetchKeyPackageAndAddMember now take
a KeyPackageEvent directly; Account.keyPackagePublishRelays delegates
to KeyPackageFetcher.
- AccountViewModel.updateMarmotGroupMetadata uses bootstrap + merged.
- AccountViewModel.sendMarmotGroupMessage builds the kind:9 template via
buildTextMessage(persistOwn = false) to avoid double-persisting.
- AccountSessionManager's NIP-05 login branch delegates to
resolveUserHexOrNull; no more hand-rolled Nip05Id / nip05Client.get.
- CLI Context exposes nip05Client and requireUserHex; syncIncoming now
calls MarmotManager.ingest; all command sites use KeyPackageFetcher
+ the shared identifier resolver. Npubs util deleted.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01M6dCKAF5Y1VyHGZPjzwDXq
Answers "can MDK and marmot-ts see and talk to a user whose group was
created on Amethyst?" — yes, after four more spec-conformance fixes:
1. parent_hash chain (RFC 9420 §7.9.2): Amethyst's commit() and
externalJoin() now compute the parent_hash for every parent node on
the committer's direct path and seal the committer's LeafNode with
the correct leaf parent_hash. Amethyst↔Amethyst used to work only
because both sides stored empty parent_hash values; against a
strict peer (ts-mls, openmls) every Amethyst-authored commit was
rejected with "Unable to verify parent hash". processCommit()
now also patches the computed parent_hashes back into its tree so
treeHash() agrees with the sender — otherwise the epoch key
schedule diverges and AEAD tags mismatch.
2. REQUIRED_CAPABILITIES extension type: 0x0002 → 0x0003 per
RFC 9420 §13.3. The old value was ratchet_tree's slot, so Amethyst's
GroupContext.extensions carried a required_capabilities blob
labelled as ratchet_tree, and openmls rejected the GroupInfo
as Malformed (ratchet_tree is not valid in GroupContext). This
completes the extension-ID set from d7114fc (ratchet_tree,
external_pub) now aligned with the IANA registry.
3. verifyParentHash on the receive side now computes the expected
chain top-down from the post-update tree rather than reading
parent_hash fields that applyUpdatePath leaves as empty
placeholders.
4. An explicit parentHash parameter on buildLeafNode so COMMIT-source
leaves include the computed value in their TBS signature.
Test harness — reverse interop (Amethyst → outside world):
- quartz/tools/{mdk,tsmls}-vector-gen/emit-joiner-kp.{rs,mjs}
generate an MDK/openmls and a marmot-ts/ts-mls KeyPackage with
marmot_group_data (0xF2EE) and self_remove (0x000A) advertised in
capabilities so Amethyst's required_capabilities is satisfiable.
- AmethystAuthoredVectorGen.kt (env-var gated JUnit test) takes the
foreign KP, adds it to a fresh Amethyst group, and emits the
Welcome plus three application PrivateMessages as JSON.
- verify-amethyst.{rs,mjs} replay the joiner's private state,
call the foreign MLS library's join + process_message, and
assert the plaintexts match.
Both verifiers now print ALL PASS end-to-end:
* openmls ← Amethyst: joinGroup + 3× process_message ✓
* ts-mls ← Amethyst: joinGroup + 3× processPrivateMessage ✓
https://claude.ai/code/session_01HfHdd5S5rvxUW2ihEpLGJr
marmot-ts (the TypeScript Marmot client — browsers, Node, Bun, Deno)
wraps a completely different MLS implementation: ts-mls. That backend
shares no code with OpenMLS, which is what MDK/whitenoise use, so
Amethyst passing on both is a strong signal that the on-wire MLS layer
is spec-correct rather than coincidentally self-consistent.
Add a Node-based generator under quartz/tools/tsmls-vector-gen/ that
uses ts-mls 2.0.0-rc.10 directly to emit:
- Alice's KeyPackage + Bob's joiner KeyPackage
- Alice's Welcome after add_member + commit
- Bob's init/encryption/signature private keys (PKCS#8 Ed25519 unwrapped
to the raw 32-byte seed for parity with the MDK vector shape)
- Post-join MLS-Exporter("marmot","group-event",32) KAT
- Three application PrivateMessages from Alice → Bob with the
expected plaintexts
TsMlsWelcomeInteropTest mirrors MdkWelcomeInteropTest but consumes the
new vector. It proves:
- KeyPackage self-signature verifies under our Ed25519 + SignContent.
- Amethyst.processWelcome unwraps the group secrets, derives the
welcome_key/nonce, AEAD-decrypts GroupInfo, verifies GroupInfoTBS
with signer_pub, decodes the ratchet tree, and binds the joiner's
leaf — end-to-end.
- Post-join exporter secret matches ts-mls byte-for-byte.
- Amethyst decrypt() parses the RFC 9420 §6.3.1 PrivateMessageContent
framing (application_data<V> + FramedContentAuthData.signature<V> +
zero padding) and verifies the sender's FramedContentTBS signature
against Alice's leaf, for all three ciphertexts.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01HfHdd5S5rvxUW2ihEpLGJr
Vitor Pamplona