Claude
9ebdfc0b81
Removes config keys + policies that don't earn their complexity:
- [limits].max_event_bytes / MaxEventBytesPolicy — duplicates
[limits].max_ws_frame_bytes which is the right layer (Ktor frame
cap at the wire), and the policy-level check ran AFTER the event
was already parsed and bound for the store.
- [limits].messages_per_sec, [limits].subscriptions_per_min /
RateLimitPolicy — per-session token buckets without the matching
per-IP / global-EPS infrastructure are mostly cosmetic; an
operator who needs real rate limits will use a reverse proxy.
Also flips [options].verify_signatures default from `false` to `true`.
A relay accepting traffic from real clients should verify Schnorr
signatures, and verify-by-default closes the footgun of forgetting
the flag. The CLI gains `--no-verify` for explicit opt-out
(test fixtures, mirror replays); the old `--verify` is dropped (a
no-op now anyway).
Removed:
- quartz-relay/.../policies/MaxEventBytesPolicy.kt
- quartz-relay/.../policies/RateLimitPolicy.kt
- 7 obsolete tests in PoliciesTest + 1 in PoliciesIntegrationTest
- The matching config fields in LimitsSection
- Sample config entries in config.example.toml
- Wiring in Main.composePolicy
Added:
- Test verifySignaturesCanBeExplicitlyDisabled covering the
new explicit-opt-out path.
Total :quartz-relay tests: 59, 0 failures.
63 lines
2.2 KiB
TOML
63 lines
2.2 KiB
TOML
# Example config for quartz-relay. Section layout mirrors
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# nostr-rs-relay's config.toml so existing operators can port across.
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#
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# Run with:
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# ./gradlew :quartz-relay:run --args="--config /etc/quartz-relay.toml"
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#
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# CLI flags override individual values: e.g. `--port 8888` wins over
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# `[network].port`.
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[info]
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# The wss:// URL clients use to reach this relay (mandatory for NIP-42
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# AUTH challenges). If not set, the relay synthesises one from the
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# [network] section.
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relay_url = "wss://relay.example.com/"
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name = "Example Quartz Relay"
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description = "A quartz-relay deployment."
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contact = "admin@example.com"
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# Operator pubkey (NIP-11). Optional.
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# pubkey = "..."
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# Override the supported NIPs advertised on the NIP-11 endpoint. If
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# omitted, the relay advertises the NIPs it actually implements.
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# supported_nips = [1, 9, 11, 40, 42, 45, 50, 62]
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[network]
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host = "0.0.0.0"
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port = 7447
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path = "/"
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[database]
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# True keeps an in-memory SQLite db (events vanish on restart). Useful
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# for tests; set false + `file = "..."` for persistent storage.
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in_memory = false
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file = "/var/lib/quartz-relay/events.db"
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[options]
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# Drop events whose Schnorr signature does not verify. Strongly
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# recommended for any relay accepting traffic from real clients.
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# Verify Schnorr signatures on every EVENT. Default: true. Disable
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# only for trusted-input scenarios (test fixtures, mirror replays).
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# verify_signatures = true
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# Require clients to NIP-42 AUTH before REQ/EVENT/COUNT.
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require_auth = false
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# Reject events whose `created_at` is more than this many seconds in
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# the future. Enforced by RejectFutureEventsPolicy.
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# reject_future_seconds = 1800
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[limits]
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# Maximum WebSocket frame size. Frames larger than this are dropped at
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# the WS layer. (max_ws_message_bytes maps to the same setting since
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# Ktor's WebSockets plugin only exposes per-frame caps.)
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# max_ws_message_bytes = 1048576
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# max_ws_frame_bytes = 1048576
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[authorization]
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# Allow / deny lists. Allow is a permissive ceiling; deny still
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# removes specific entries inside it. Enforced by Pubkey/KindAllowDenyPolicy.
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# pubkey_whitelist = ["abcdef...64hex..."]
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# pubkey_blacklist = []
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# kind_whitelist = [0, 1, 3, 7, 1059, 30023]
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# kind_blacklist = [4]
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