Round 5 of the audit follow-ups. The remaining low-leverage items
from the original audit all addressed in one pass.
* PathValidator: pick the smallest spare CID sequence number rather
than LinkedHashMap insertion order. RFC 9000 §19.15 lets the peer
issue NEW_CONNECTION_ID out of sequence (e.g. retransmits arriving
after newer offers); insertion-order picking would land on
whichever offer arrived first instead of the lowest seq, drifting
away from the RFC-expected ordering. forceRotateToHigherSequence
also now filters >= retirePriorToWatermark explicitly so we never
pick a sequence below the watermark even if the pool somehow holds
one.
* QuicWebTransportSessionState.close: driver.wakeup() AFTER enqueuing
the WT_CLOSE_SESSION capsule + FIN but BEFORE driver.close, so the
capsule actually reaches the wire instead of being short-circuited
by the driver shutdown. Pre-fix the peer saw an abrupt UDP-level
tear-down with no application-error-code surfaced.
* QuicStream.resetStream / stopSending: synchronized(this) atomic
CAS for the "first call wins" gate. Pre-fix two concurrent callers
could both observe `resetState == null` and both write — the
second caller's errorCode would clobber the first while
resetEmitPending was already set, so the writer emitted the
RESET_STREAM with whichever value landed last.
* Http3Settings.decodeBody: per-id value range checks. A peer that
advertises e.g. MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE = 2^60 could otherwise
drive our encoder into unbounded heap. Bounds chosen above any
legitimate value (1 GiB for table-capacity / field-section caps,
1 for boolean flags) and below 2^32 for unknown ids.
* Privatize crypto-relevant static byte arrays:
InitialSecrets.V1_INITIAL_SALT, RetryPacket.V1_RETRY_KEY,
RetryPacket.V1_RETRY_NONCE. Pre-fix these were public mutable
ByteArrays — any caller could stomp on them, and any toString /
reflection would leak the bytes. Crypto material doesn't need to
be reachable outside the deriving / sealing path.
* peekHeader length cast: re-verified as already safe (lengthRaw is
bounded by r.remaining before .toInt() — Int.MAX_VALUE ceiling
enforced).
All 269 :quic:jvmTest tests pass. BUILD SUCCESSFUL in 2m 17s.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01AhGvbMV8uPRse3TmAGaddM
Claude
ce8d852518