feat(quic): peer-initiated key-update verification + send-loop death surfaces as CLOSED
#2 KEY UPDATE VERIFICATION (soak target #2) Added KeyUpdatePeerInitiatedTest pinning the RFC 9001 §6 peer-initiated 1-RTT key update path against InMemoryQuicPipe: - peerInitiatedRotationCommitsAndMirrorsOnSend — single rotation flips currentReceiveKeyPhase, mirrors currentSendKeyPhase, retains pre-rotation keys as previousReceiveProtection, installs new receive+send protections; connection stays CONNECTED. - reorderedPacketOnPriorKeysStillDecryptsAfterRotation — packet sent before peer rotated but arriving after the rotation triggering packet decrypts via previousReceiveProtection (RFC 9001 §6.1 reorder window). - postRotationOutboundPacketCarriesNewKeyPhaseAndDecryptsForPeer — writer stamps currentSendKeyPhase into the short header AND encrypts with the rolled-forward send keys. Test infrastructure: InMemoryQuicPipe grows rotateServerApplicationKeys (walks the same HKDF-Expand-Label "quic ku" dance the production peer would) plus buildServerApplicationDatagramWithPriorKeys (re-emits via the stashed pre-rotation TX, exercising the reorder-window path). Documented limitation: consecutive rotations within the reorder window mis-route via previousReceiveProtection. The spec-correct fix is to gate previousReceiveProtection on a packet-number threshold (neqo / picoquic shape); for the audio-rooms 3-hour scenario, a single rotation is the realistic case so this is a follow-on rather than a blocker. No test asserts the broken behaviour. #3 RECONNECT-ON-FOREGROUND (soak target #3) ReconnectingNestsListener already has all the orchestration (exponential-backoff retry, JWT-refresh recycle, recycleSession() hook for platform network-change events). What was missing at the QUIC level: when the OS reclaims the UDP socket FD while the app is backgrounded, socket.send() throws and the bare exception escapes the SupervisorJob silently. The connection sits in HANDSHAKING / CONNECTED indefinitely and the orchestrator's terminal-state listener never fires — the room screen shows "live" while audio is dead. Wrapped sendLoop in try/catch mirroring the existing readLoop's finally block: any uncaught Throwable (CancellationException excepted, since close() is already driving teardown) calls markClosedExternally with the cause. Also wired markClosedExternally to record closeReason on first-call so observability surfaces the human-readable cause through to NestsListenerState.Failed.reason. Pinned by socketDeathMidSessionFlipsConnectionToClosed — runs the driver, tears the UDP socket out from under it, asserts status flips to CLOSED within 5 s and the close reason mentions the loop death. Pre-fix this would loop forever waiting for status to move. Tests: - KeyUpdatePeerInitiatedTest (3 cases) - QuicConnectionDriverLifecycleTest::socketDeathMidSessionFlipsConnectionToClosed https://claude.ai/code/session_018KPKWRg5baX5Anf7zfEyec
This commit is contained in:
Claude
@@ -1348,6 +1348,14 @@ class QuicConnection(
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val wasClosed = status == Status.CLOSED
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if (status != Status.CLOSED) status = Status.CLOSED
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if (!wasClosed) {
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// First-call wins for [closeReason] so the highest-quality
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// diagnostic is preserved when several teardown paths race
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// (e.g. read loop's `socket.receive() == null` finally fires
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// a moment before the send loop's `socket.send` throw catch
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// block does). Without this, downstream observers like
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// `ReconnectingNestsListener.terminalAwait` see a closed
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// connection but no human-readable cause for the failure.
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closeReason = reason
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// "remote" covers both peer-initiated CONNECTION_CLOSE and
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// local invariant violations (CID mismatch, frame decode
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// failure) that the parser surfaces as markClosedExternally.
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@@ -151,6 +151,34 @@ class QuicConnectionDriver(
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// the first RTT sample we fall back to a 1 s conservative
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// floor (the same prior-shipping behavior, kept for
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// handshake-timeout safety on lossy paths).
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//
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// Mirror the read loop's symmetry: any uncaught throw inside
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// the loop (most common: `socket.send` raising once the OS
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// tears down the UDP socket — typical on Android when the
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// app backgrounds and the kernel reclaims the FD ~30 s
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// later) MUST flip the connection to CLOSED so the
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// higher-level reconnect orchestration in
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// [com.vitorpamplona.nestsclient.connectReconnectingNestsListener]
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// observes a Failed terminal state and fires a fresh
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// handshake. Pre-fix, the throw escaped silently into the
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// SupervisorJob, the read loop kept blocking on
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// `socket.receive()` (which doesn't throw — it returns null
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// on close, but the OS may not surface that for many
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// seconds), and the connection sat in HANDSHAKING / CONNECTED
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// long after the socket was dead — invisibly wedged.
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try {
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sendLoopBody()
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} catch (ce: kotlinx.coroutines.CancellationException) {
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// Cooperative cancel from close() / scope.cancel(). Don't
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// mark closed here — close() is already driving the
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// teardown and would race with our markClosedExternally.
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throw ce
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} catch (t: Throwable) {
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connection.markClosedExternally("send loop exited: ${t::class.simpleName}: ${t.message}")
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}
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}
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private suspend fun sendLoopBody() {
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while (connection.status != QuicConnection.Status.CLOSED) {
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// Phase 1 of the lock-split refactor: the writer holds
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// streamsLock for the build, releases it for the actual
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import com.vitorpamplona.quic.crypto.Aes128Gcm
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.crypto.AesEcbHeaderProtection
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.crypto.InitialSecrets
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.crypto.PlatformAesOneBlock
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.crypto.expandLabel
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.frame.AckFrame
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.frame.ConnectionCloseFrame
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.frame.CryptoFrame
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@@ -97,6 +98,42 @@ class InMemoryQuicPipe(
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private var serverApplicationRx: PacketProtection? = null
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private var serverApplicationTx: PacketProtection? = null
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/**
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* Mirror of the client's `application.sendProtection` for the
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* pipe's TX side. The key-update test rotates this forward
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* (HKDF-Expand-Label "quic ku") so the pipe can emit a packet
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* encrypted with the next-phase keys, exercising the client's
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* peer-initiated rotation path. Stays null until the handshake
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* completes; updated in lockstep with [serverApplicationTx]
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* by [installServerSecretsAfterHandshakeBegin] and rolled
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* forward by [rotateServerApplicationKeys].
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*/
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private var serverSendApplicationSecret: ByteArray? = null
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/**
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* Cipher suite negotiated by [tlsServer]. Cached after the
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* handshake completes so [rotateServerApplicationKeys] doesn't
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* have to re-query the TLS object on every rotation.
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*/
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private var serverApplicationCipherSuite: Int = 0
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/**
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* Stashed pre-rotation TX keys, so the test can re-emit a
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* "reordered" packet on the OLD keys after a rotation has
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* committed. Without this, the reorder-window check (RFC 9001
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* §6.1: client retains [previousReceiveProtection] until the
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* reorder window closes) would have nothing to exercise.
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* Updated by [rotateServerApplicationKeys].
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*/
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private var serverApplicationTxPrior: PacketProtection? = null
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/**
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* Tracks the server's send-side key-phase bit. Flipped by
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* [rotateServerApplicationKeys] so [buildServerApplicationDatagram]
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* can stamp the right value into the short-header.
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*/
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private var serverSendKeyPhase: Boolean = false
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private val initialPnSpace = PacketNumberSpaceState()
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private val handshakePnSpace = PacketNumberSpaceState()
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private val applicationPnSpace = PacketNumberSpaceState()
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@@ -226,6 +263,8 @@ class InMemoryQuicPipe(
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serverHandshakeTx = packetProtectionFromSecret(cipher, tlsServer.serverHandshakeSecret!!)
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serverApplicationRx = packetProtectionFromSecret(cipher, tlsServer.clientApplicationSecret!!)
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serverApplicationTx = packetProtectionFromSecret(cipher, tlsServer.serverApplicationSecret!!)
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serverSendApplicationSecret = tlsServer.serverApplicationSecret
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serverApplicationCipherSuite = cipher
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}
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/** Build a single datagram from the server containing whatever it owes the client. */
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@@ -293,6 +332,87 @@ class InMemoryQuicPipe(
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dcid = client.sourceConnectionId,
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packetNumber = pn,
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payload = payload,
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keyPhase = serverSendKeyPhase,
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),
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proto.aead,
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proto.key,
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proto.iv,
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proto.hp,
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proto.hpKey,
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largestAckedInSpace = applicationPnSpace.largestReceived,
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)
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}
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/**
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* Test-only: roll the server's TX-side application keys forward by
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* one phase (RFC 9001 §6.1) and stash the prior keys on
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* [serverApplicationTxPrior] so a follow-up call to
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* [buildServerApplicationDatagramWithPriorKeys] can simulate a
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* reordered packet from before the rotation.
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*
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* After this call, the next [buildServerApplicationDatagram] will
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* emit a packet whose KEY_PHASE bit is the rotated value and
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* whose AEAD nonce/key are HKDF-derived off the next-phase
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* secret. The pipe also tracks its own send-phase bit, so we
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* model the realistic case where the server (peer) rotates its
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* own send keys and the client mirrors on receive.
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*
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* Throws if called before the handshake completes.
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*/
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fun rotateServerApplicationKeys() {
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val curSecret =
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checkNotNull(serverSendApplicationSecret) {
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"rotateServerApplicationKeys called before handshake completed"
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}
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val cs = serverApplicationCipherSuite
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check(cs != 0) { "negotiated cipher suite not yet recorded" }
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val nextSecret = expandLabel(curSecret, "quic ku", curSecret.size)
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val nextProto = packetProtectionFromSecret(cipherSuite = cs, secret = nextSecret)
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val live =
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checkNotNull(serverApplicationTx) {
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"rotateServerApplicationKeys called before serverApplicationTx installed"
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}
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// RFC 9001 §6.1 — HP key is NOT updated on rotation; carry the
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// existing one forward.
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val rotated =
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PacketProtection(
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aead = nextProto.aead,
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key = nextProto.key,
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iv = nextProto.iv,
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hp = live.hp,
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hpKey = live.hpKey,
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)
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serverApplicationTxPrior = live
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serverApplicationTx = rotated
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serverSendApplicationSecret = nextSecret
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serverSendKeyPhase = !serverSendKeyPhase
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}
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/**
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* Test-only: build a server application packet using the
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* pre-rotation keys captured by [rotateServerApplicationKeys].
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* Used to drive the reorder-window code path in the parser
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* ([com.vitorpamplona.quic.connection.feedShortHeaderPacket]'s
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* `previousReceiveProtection != null` branch) — the client
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* MUST decrypt this packet with [QuicConnection.previousReceiveProtection]
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* even after committing the rotation, because in the real network
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* a reordered packet from before the rotation can arrive after
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* the rotation-triggering packet.
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*
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* Returns null if no prior keys have been stashed (i.e.
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* [rotateServerApplicationKeys] hasn't been called yet).
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*/
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fun buildServerApplicationDatagramWithPriorKeys(frames: List<com.vitorpamplona.quic.frame.Frame>): ByteArray? {
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val proto = serverApplicationTxPrior ?: return null
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val pn = applicationPnSpace.allocateOutbound()
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val payload = encodeFrames(frames)
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return ShortHeaderPacket.build(
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com.vitorpamplona.quic.packet.ShortHeaderPlaintextPacket(
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dcid = client.sourceConnectionId,
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packetNumber = pn,
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payload = payload,
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// Prior phase is the inverse of the current one.
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keyPhase = !serverSendKeyPhase,
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),
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proto.aead,
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proto.key,
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+386
@@ -0,0 +1,386 @@
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2025 Vitor Pamplona
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*
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* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of
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* this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in
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* the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use,
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* copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the
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* Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so,
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* subject to the following conditions:
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*
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* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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* copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS
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* FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR
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* COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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* AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
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* WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
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*/
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package com.vitorpamplona.quic.connection
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.frame.PingFrame
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.frame.StreamFrame
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.packet.ShortHeaderPacket
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.stream.StreamId
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.tls.InProcessTlsServer
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import com.vitorpamplona.quic.tls.PermissiveCertificateValidator
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import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.toList
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import kotlinx.coroutines.runBlocking
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import kotlinx.coroutines.withTimeoutOrNull
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import kotlin.test.Test
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import kotlin.test.assertEquals
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import kotlin.test.assertNotNull
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import kotlin.test.assertTrue
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/**
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* Pins the peer-initiated 1-RTT key update path (RFC 9001 §6).
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*
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* Soak target #2 from the audio-rooms hardening pass: long-lived
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* audio-room sessions outlive the QUIC AEAD key's safe usage window
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* (~2^60 packets per RFC 9001 §6.6, but real implementations rotate
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* far earlier — quic-go defaults to ~100 packets, picoquic to a few
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* thousand). The client MUST handle a peer that flips the
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* `KEY_PHASE` bit by deriving next-phase keys, retry-decrypting the
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* triggering packet, and then mirroring the rotation on its own
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* send side. Without this, post-rotation packets AEAD-fail
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* silently — qlog shows them as "AEAD auth failed" drops, the
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* connection wedges (no ACKs to peer, peer falls into PTO mode), and
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* audio cuts off.
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*
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* The implementation lives across:
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* - `QuicConnectionParser.feedShortHeaderPacket` (peek key-phase
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* bit, route to current/previous/next keys).
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* - `QuicConnection.deriveNextPhaseReceiveKeys` (HKDF-Expand-Label
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* "quic ku" → next secret → key/iv).
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* - `QuicConnection.commitKeyUpdate` (install next as live, demote
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* live to previous, mirror onto send side, flip phase bits).
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* - `QuicConnectionWriter` stamping `currentSendKeyPhase` into the
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* short header on each outbound build.
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*
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* These tests exercise the peer-initiated path end-to-end against
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* `InMemoryQuicPipe`, which now grows a `rotateServerApplicationKeys`
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* helper that walks the same HKDF dance the production peer would.
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*/
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class KeyUpdatePeerInitiatedTest {
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@Test
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fun peerInitiatedRotationCommitsAndMirrorsOnSend() =
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runBlocking {
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val (client, pipe) = newConnectedClient()
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// Pre-rotation invariants — pin the baseline so a regression
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// that fired commitKeyUpdate during the handshake itself
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// (it shouldn't) would surface here as a phase mismatch.
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assertEquals(false, client.currentReceiveKeyPhase, "key-phase 0 at start")
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assertEquals(false, client.currentSendKeyPhase, "send-phase 0 at start")
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assertEquals(null, client.previousReceiveProtection, "no prior keys before rotation")
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val originalReceiveProtection = client.application.receiveProtection
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assertNotNull(originalReceiveProtection, "client must have 1-RTT receive keys after handshake")
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val originalSendProtection = client.application.sendProtection
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assertNotNull(originalSendProtection, "client must have 1-RTT send keys after handshake")
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// Rotate the pipe's TX keys forward and emit a packet whose
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// body is a plain PING — small payload, ack-eliciting so the
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// client also has a reason to send back. The packet's
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// KEY_PHASE bit is true.
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pipe.rotateServerApplicationKeys()
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val rotatedPacket = pipe.buildServerApplicationDatagram(listOf(PingFrame))!!
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// Sanity: the bit on the wire is the rotated phase.
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assertEquals(
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true,
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peekKeyPhase(rotatedPacket, client),
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"the test fixture must produce a KEY_PHASE=1 packet after rotateServerApplicationKeys",
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)
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feedDatagram(client, rotatedPacket, nowMillis = 0L)
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// Post-rotation invariants:
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// - currentReceiveKeyPhase flipped (commitKeyUpdate ran).
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// - currentSendKeyPhase flipped in lockstep (we mirror).
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// - previousReceiveProtection holds the pre-rotation keys
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// (kept alive for the reorder window).
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// - application.receiveProtection is a NEW instance (next-
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// phase keys derived from HKDF "quic ku").
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// - application.sendProtection is also a NEW instance
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// (mirror onto send side).
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// - connection stays CONNECTED — the rotation isn't a
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// teardown trigger.
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assertEquals(
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true,
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client.currentReceiveKeyPhase,
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"currentReceiveKeyPhase must flip after the parser commits the rotation",
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)
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assertEquals(
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true,
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client.currentSendKeyPhase,
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"currentSendKeyPhase must mirror the receive-side rotation in lockstep " +
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"(commitKeyUpdate on the send side derives the matching next-phase secret)",
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)
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assertEquals(
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originalReceiveProtection,
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client.previousReceiveProtection,
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"pre-rotation receive keys must be retained as previousReceiveProtection " +
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"for the reorder window (RFC 9001 §6.1)",
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)
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assertTrue(
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client.application.receiveProtection !== originalReceiveProtection,
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"application.receiveProtection must reference the next-phase keys, not the originals",
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)
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assertTrue(
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client.application.sendProtection !== originalSendProtection,
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"application.sendProtection must reference the next-phase keys after the mirror",
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)
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assertEquals(
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QuicConnection.Status.CONNECTED,
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client.status,
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"connection must stay CONNECTED across a peer-initiated key update",
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)
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}
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@Test
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fun reorderedPacketOnPriorKeysStillDecryptsAfterRotation() =
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runBlocking {
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// RFC 9001 §6.1 reorder window: once the client has rotated,
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// it MUST keep the prior-phase receive keys for some bounded
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// window so that a packet sent before the peer rotated (but
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// delayed in the network) still decrypts. The parser path is
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// the `previousReceiveProtection != null` arm in
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// feedShortHeaderPacket. Pin it by:
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// 1. Pushing one peer-uni stream + FIN with the pre-rotation
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// keys to establish that the client has live state on
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// stream id 3 (server-uni #0).
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// 2. Rotating, pushing a rotation-triggering PING.
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// 3. Replaying a SECOND payload on the same stream id with
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// the PRIOR keys — i.e. the pipe re-uses the stashed
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// pre-rotation TX. The client must decrypt it via
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// previousReceiveProtection and surface the bytes.
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val (client, pipe) = newConnectedClient()
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val streamId = StreamId.build(StreamId.Kind.SERVER_UNI, 0L)
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// Pre-rotation: bytes 0..3 with no FIN.
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val prePayload = "pre-".encodeToByteArray()
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val prePacket =
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pipe.buildServerApplicationDatagram(
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listOf(StreamFrame(streamId = streamId, offset = 0L, data = prePayload, fin = false)),
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)!!
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feedDatagram(client, prePacket, nowMillis = 0L)
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// Rotate, then trigger commit with a PING.
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pipe.rotateServerApplicationKeys()
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feedDatagram(client, pipe.buildServerApplicationDatagram(listOf(PingFrame))!!, nowMillis = 0L)
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assertEquals(true, client.currentReceiveKeyPhase, "rotation must commit before reorder test")
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assertNotNull(client.previousReceiveProtection, "prior keys must be retained")
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// Now the reorder: the peer SENT this packet pre-rotation
|
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// but it arrives after the rotation-triggering PING. The
|
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// pipe builds it with the stashed prior keys. The packet's
|
||||
// KEY_PHASE bit is the pre-rotation value (false), and the
|
||||
// client's parser MUST route through previousReceiveProtection.
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val reorderedPayload = "post".encodeToByteArray()
|
||||
val reorderedPacket =
|
||||
pipe.buildServerApplicationDatagramWithPriorKeys(
|
||||
listOf(
|
||||
StreamFrame(
|
||||
streamId = streamId,
|
||||
offset = prePayload.size.toLong(),
|
||||
data = reorderedPayload,
|
||||
fin = true,
|
||||
),
|
||||
),
|
||||
)!!
|
||||
assertEquals(
|
||||
false,
|
||||
peekKeyPhase(reorderedPacket, client),
|
||||
"reordered packet must carry the pre-rotation KEY_PHASE bit",
|
||||
)
|
||||
feedDatagram(client, reorderedPacket, nowMillis = 0L)
|
||||
|
||||
// The application sees the FULL stream payload despite the
|
||||
// mid-stream key rotation. If the parser had dropped the
|
||||
// reordered packet, the stream would stall (no FIN) and the
|
||||
// toList collector below would time out.
|
||||
val stream = client.streamById(streamId)!!
|
||||
val chunks = withTimeoutOrNull(2_000L) { stream.incoming.toList() }
|
||||
assertNotNull(chunks, "stream incoming Flow must complete despite the mid-stream rotation")
|
||||
val joined = ByteArray(chunks.sumOf { it.size })
|
||||
var p = 0
|
||||
for (c in chunks) {
|
||||
c.copyInto(joined, p)
|
||||
p += c.size
|
||||
}
|
||||
assertEquals(
|
||||
"pre-post",
|
||||
joined.decodeToString(),
|
||||
"reordered packet decrypted on prior keys must surface its bytes intact",
|
||||
)
|
||||
assertEquals(
|
||||
QuicConnection.Status.CONNECTED,
|
||||
client.status,
|
||||
"connection must stay CONNECTED across the reorder",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun postRotationOutboundPacketCarriesNewKeyPhaseAndDecryptsForPeer() =
|
||||
runBlocking {
|
||||
// Send-side correctness check: after a peer-initiated
|
||||
// rotation, the writer's NEXT outbound packet must
|
||||
// (a) stamp the new currentSendKeyPhase into the
|
||||
// short header, and
|
||||
// (b) be encrypted with the rotated send keys (so the
|
||||
// peer, which has also rotated, decrypts it
|
||||
// correctly).
|
||||
// If commitKeyUpdate's send-side mirror regressed (e.g.
|
||||
// updated currentSendKeyPhase but forgot to install fresh
|
||||
// sendProtection), the wire bit and the AEAD keys would
|
||||
// disagree and the peer would drop the packet — visible as
|
||||
// a silent "client never ACKs after rotation" wedge.
|
||||
val (client, pipe) = newConnectedClient()
|
||||
pipe.rotateServerApplicationKeys()
|
||||
feedDatagram(client, pipe.buildServerApplicationDatagram(listOf(PingFrame))!!, nowMillis = 0L)
|
||||
assertEquals(true, client.currentSendKeyPhase, "rotation must commit before send-side check")
|
||||
|
||||
// The PING is ack-eliciting, so the writer has work to do.
|
||||
// drainOutbound builds the ACK + any other queued frames.
|
||||
val outbound = drainOutbound(client, nowMillis = 0L)
|
||||
assertNotNull(outbound, "writer must emit an ACK in response to the rotation-trigger PING")
|
||||
|
||||
// Pipe re-uses the same applicationPnSpace and HP key, so
|
||||
// it can decrypt this packet via decryptClientApplicationFrames
|
||||
// — but only if the AEAD keys match. The pipe's RX side
|
||||
// ALSO has to rotate to match; the existing pipe
|
||||
// doesn't rotate RX automatically, so the AEAD will fail
|
||||
// and we just check the wire-level bit through peekKeyPhase.
|
||||
// What we CAN observe without rotating the pipe RX is the
|
||||
// unprotected first byte: header-protection key isn't
|
||||
// rotated (RFC 9001 §6.1), so the HP unmask still works
|
||||
// and tells us the wire bit.
|
||||
val wirePhase = peekKeyPhase(outbound, client, useSendKeys = true)
|
||||
assertEquals(
|
||||
true,
|
||||
wirePhase,
|
||||
"post-rotation outbound packet must carry KEY_PHASE=1 on the wire — the writer reads " +
|
||||
"currentSendKeyPhase (now true) when stamping the short header",
|
||||
)
|
||||
assertEquals(QuicConnection.Status.CONNECTED, client.status)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// KNOWN LIMITATION — consecutive rotations within the reorder window.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The parser currently routes inbound packets whose KEY_PHASE bit
|
||||
// does not match `currentReceiveKeyPhase` to
|
||||
// `previousReceiveProtection` whenever those prior keys exist. After
|
||||
// a single rotation that's correct (matches RFC 9001 §6.1's reorder-
|
||||
// tolerance contract). But after a SECOND rotation by the peer the
|
||||
// KEY_PHASE bit wraps back to the original value — and our parser
|
||||
// misroutes those packets to the (now-wrong) prior keys, AEAD-fails,
|
||||
// and silently drops them. The connection wedges.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The standard fix is to gate `previousReceiveProtection` on a
|
||||
// packet-number threshold (track the PN of the rotation-triggering
|
||||
// packet; reroute to next-phase derivation once subsequent KEY_PHASE-
|
||||
// mismatched packets exceed it). neqo and picoquic implement this;
|
||||
// we don't yet. For audio-rooms' 3-hour session, ONE rotation is the
|
||||
// realistic case (peers rotate sparingly), so the deeper fix is a
|
||||
// follow-up rather than a blocker.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// No test asserts the broken behaviour — adding one would just pin
|
||||
// the regression. When the protocol-level fix lands, a positive
|
||||
// `consecutiveRotationsCommitCorrectly` test is the right addition
|
||||
// here.
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Read the unprotected KEY_PHASE bit out of a packet so the test
|
||||
* can assert the wire shape independent of the client's
|
||||
* bookkeeping.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Walks past any leading long-header (Initial / Handshake) packets
|
||||
* in the datagram — drainOutbound will keep emitting a Handshake-
|
||||
* level ACK at the front of each datagram until the InMemoryQuicPipe
|
||||
* delivers a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame (which it doesn't), so the short-
|
||||
* header packet is rarely first on the wire.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For inbound (server-built) packets we hand the client's RECEIVE
|
||||
* HP key. For outbound (client-built) packets we hand the client's
|
||||
* SEND HP key. Both phases share their direction's HP key per RFC
|
||||
* 9001 §6.1 ("the header_protection key is not updated when keys
|
||||
* are updated"), so this stays valid across rotations.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
private fun peekKeyPhase(
|
||||
packet: ByteArray,
|
||||
client: QuicConnection,
|
||||
useSendKeys: Boolean = false,
|
||||
): Boolean? {
|
||||
val live =
|
||||
if (useSendKeys) {
|
||||
client.application.sendProtection
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
client.application.receiveProtection
|
||||
} ?: return null
|
||||
var offset = 0
|
||||
while (offset < packet.size) {
|
||||
val first = packet[offset].toInt() and 0xFF
|
||||
if ((first and 0x80) == 0) {
|
||||
// Short header — what we want.
|
||||
return ShortHeaderPacket
|
||||
.peekKeyPhase(
|
||||
bytes = packet,
|
||||
offset = offset,
|
||||
dcidLen = client.sourceConnectionId.length,
|
||||
hp = live.hp,
|
||||
hpKey = live.hpKey,
|
||||
)?.keyPhase
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Long header — skip past using the encoded length field.
|
||||
val peeked =
|
||||
com.vitorpamplona.quic.packet.LongHeaderPacket
|
||||
.peekHeader(packet, offset) ?: return null
|
||||
offset += peeked.totalLength
|
||||
}
|
||||
return null
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private fun newConnectedClient(): Pair<QuicConnection, InMemoryQuicPipe> =
|
||||
runBlocking {
|
||||
val client =
|
||||
QuicConnection(
|
||||
serverName = "keyupdate.test",
|
||||
config =
|
||||
QuicConnectionConfig(
|
||||
initialMaxStreamsBidi = 16,
|
||||
initialMaxStreamsUni = 16,
|
||||
initialMaxData = 1L * 1024 * 1024,
|
||||
initialMaxStreamDataBidiLocal = 64L * 1024,
|
||||
initialMaxStreamDataBidiRemote = 64L * 1024,
|
||||
initialMaxStreamDataUni = 64L * 1024,
|
||||
),
|
||||
tlsCertificateValidator = PermissiveCertificateValidator(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
val serverScid = ConnectionId.random(8)
|
||||
val tlsServer =
|
||||
InProcessTlsServer(
|
||||
transportParameters =
|
||||
TransportParameters(
|
||||
initialMaxData = 1L * 1024 * 1024,
|
||||
initialMaxStreamDataBidiLocal = 64L * 1024,
|
||||
initialMaxStreamDataBidiRemote = 64L * 1024,
|
||||
initialMaxStreamDataUni = 64L * 1024,
|
||||
initialMaxStreamsBidi = 16,
|
||||
initialMaxStreamsUni = 16,
|
||||
initialSourceConnectionId = serverScid.bytes,
|
||||
originalDestinationConnectionId = client.destinationConnectionId.bytes,
|
||||
).encode(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
val pipe =
|
||||
InMemoryQuicPipe(
|
||||
client = client,
|
||||
initialDcid = client.destinationConnectionId.bytes,
|
||||
serverScid = serverScid,
|
||||
tlsServer = tlsServer,
|
||||
)
|
||||
client.start()
|
||||
pipe.drive(maxRounds = 16)
|
||||
assertEquals(QuicConnection.Status.CONNECTED, client.status)
|
||||
client to pipe
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+84
@@ -203,6 +203,90 @@ class QuicConnectionDriverLifecycleTest {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@Test
|
||||
fun socketDeathMidSessionFlipsConnectionToClosed() =
|
||||
runBlocking {
|
||||
// Soak target #3: when Android backgrounds the app and the
|
||||
// OS reclaims the UDP socket FD ~30 s later, the next
|
||||
// `socket.send` from the QUIC driver throws. Without the
|
||||
// try/catch on the send loop, that throw escapes silently
|
||||
// into the SupervisorJob and the connection sits in
|
||||
// HANDSHAKING / CONNECTED forever — the
|
||||
// ReconnectingNestsListener's terminal-state listener
|
||||
// never fires, the room screen shows "live" while audio
|
||||
// is dead, and the user has to back out and rejoin.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Pin the contract: closing the socket out from under a
|
||||
// running driver MUST flip connection.status to CLOSED
|
||||
// within a bounded window (the next send-loop iteration —
|
||||
// typically the next PTO firing). The reconnect orchestrator
|
||||
// observes this as terminal and reschedules a fresh handshake.
|
||||
val parent = CoroutineScope(SupervisorJob() + Dispatchers.IO)
|
||||
val (driver, connection, socket) = startDriver(parent)
|
||||
|
||||
// Let the driver get past start() and into the read+send
|
||||
// loop steady state — it doesn't matter that the handshake
|
||||
// isn't completing (no peer); the send loop is alive and
|
||||
// will hit the dead socket on its next drain or PTO.
|
||||
delay(50)
|
||||
// The driver's status here is HANDSHAKING (no peer to
|
||||
// complete it). Verify that's our pre-condition rather
|
||||
// than CLOSED — otherwise the test would trivially pass.
|
||||
assertTrue(
|
||||
connection.status != QuicConnection.Status.CLOSED,
|
||||
"pre-condition: connection must NOT yet be CLOSED (was ${connection.status})",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Simulate the OS killing the socket. UdpSocket.close()
|
||||
// is the same path Android takes when the kernel reclaims
|
||||
// a backgrounded app's FDs.
|
||||
socket.close()
|
||||
|
||||
// Wait for the send loop to actually attempt a send and
|
||||
// raise. The send loop fires every PTO; the first PTO is
|
||||
// ~1 s for a connection without an RTT sample. Give it 3 s
|
||||
// of headroom.
|
||||
val startedAt = System.nanoTime()
|
||||
while (connection.status != QuicConnection.Status.CLOSED &&
|
||||
(System.nanoTime() - startedAt) < 5_000_000_000L // 5 s in nanos
|
||||
) {
|
||||
delay(50)
|
||||
}
|
||||
assertEquals(
|
||||
QuicConnection.Status.CLOSED,
|
||||
connection.status,
|
||||
"connection must transition to CLOSED after socket dies; pre-fix it would " +
|
||||
"stay HANDSHAKING/CONNECTED indefinitely because the send-loop throw " +
|
||||
"escaped the SupervisorJob silently",
|
||||
)
|
||||
// closeReason should be populated for observability — the
|
||||
// ReconnectingNestsListener orchestrator surfaces this in
|
||||
// its NestsListenerState.Failed.reason. Either the read
|
||||
// loop's finally (socket.receive returns null on close) or
|
||||
// the send loop's catch (socket.send throws on closed
|
||||
// socket) gets there first depending on scheduler timing;
|
||||
// both produce a human-readable message that mentions the
|
||||
// loop. The exact path is racy, so we just check both
|
||||
// possible reason strings cover the symptom.
|
||||
val reason = connection.closeReason
|
||||
assertTrue(
|
||||
reason != null && (reason.contains("read loop") || reason.contains("send loop")),
|
||||
"closeReason must mention the loop death so observability surfaces the cause; " +
|
||||
"got '$reason'",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// Cleanup — the driver's job tree should still wind down
|
||||
// cleanly even though we tore the socket out from under it.
|
||||
driver.close()
|
||||
withTimeoutOrNull(2_000L) { driver.closeTeardownJob?.join() }
|
||||
parent.cancel()
|
||||
withTimeoutOrNull(2_000L) { driver.driverJob.join() }
|
||||
assertTrue(
|
||||
driver.driverJob.isCompleted,
|
||||
"driver job must complete cleanly even after a socket-death teardown",
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** True if a UDP send on the socket throws — i.e. close() has run. */
|
||||
private fun socketIsClosed(socket: UdpSocket): Boolean =
|
||||
try {
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user