processBitmap silently swallowed any exception from bitmap.toBlurhash()
or bitmap.toThumbhash() via runCatching{...}.getOrNull(), making it
impossible to diagnose why a video upload's published imeta had blurhash
but no thumbhash (or neither). Add an .onFailure { Log.w(...) } to each
runCatching so the actual exception class + stack reach logcat.
When the user long-pressed a playing video and tapped "Add Media to
Gallery", the share-action overlay (RenderTopButtons.kt:302) hard-coded
blurhash/dim/hash to null and built an inline MediaUrlVideo without
those fields. Result: the published ProfileGalleryEntryEvent (kind 1163)
carried only the URL, alt, e, m, and client tags — no x/dim/blurhash/
thumbhash — even when the source kind:1 imeta carried them.
Upstream commit df6103ffdd ("truthful ECN reporting") replaced
`AckEcnCounts(0, 0, 0)` on 1-RTT ACK frames with
`ecnCounts = null`, on the rationale that hardcoded zero counts
were "lying" while we marked outbound ECT(0) but didn't read
inbound TOS.
That broke the interop runner's `ecn` testcase against quinn:
the runner's `_check_ack_ecn` requires at least one ACK_ECN
frame in the trace (`hasattr(p["quic"], "ack.ect0_count")`),
and explicitly says "we only check whether the trace contains
any ACK-ECN information, not whether it is valid". Without
the field present the runner reports "Client did not send any
ACK-ECN frames" and fails. 0/3 against quinn (was 19/22).
Re-emit `AckEcnCounts(0, 0, 0)` with corrected reasoning:
- We mark outbound packets ECT(0) (peers' tracking benefits).
- We don't read inbound TOS (JDK DatagramChannel needs JNI for
`IP_RECVTOS`, deferred). So we observe ZERO ECT-marked
inbound packets.
- Reporting 0 counts IS accurate to that observation. RFC 9000
§13.4.2 doesn't penalize a path that never sees marks; it
only requires the count be a "cumulative count of received
QUIC packets that were marked with the corresponding ECN
codepoint" — which is exactly 0 under our limitation.
The Initial / Handshake-space ACKs stay plain (RFC 9000 §13.4
forbids ECN on long headers); only application-space gets the
ECN counts.
Verified end-to-end:
- quinn ecn: 3/3 (was 0/3 post-rebase, 1/1 pre-rebase).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
RFC 9000 §5.1.1 + §19.15: a client SHOULD advertise spare source
CIDs to the peer via NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames so the peer has
DCIDs available for path migration / NAT rebind. Strict server
stacks (quic-go, picoquic, msquic, mvfst) refuse to validate a new
client path until they have a spare DCID — server log shows
"skipping validation of new path … since no connection ID is
available". Quinn migrates on src-port-change alone, which is why
rebind-port / rebind-addr passed against quinn pre-fix and failed
against the others.
Adds:
- IssuedSourceConnectionIdEntry (data class) — sequence + CID +
stateless-reset token tuple.
- QuicConnection.issuedSourceConnectionIds (LinkedHashMap) — pool
of currently-active issued SCIDs, seeded with seq=0 (the
initial CID, no token because the stateless_reset_token TP is
server-only per RFC 9000 §18.2).
- QuicConnection.issueOwnConnectionIdsLocked(count) — drives the
initial issuance once handshake is confirmed; appends recovery
tokens to pendingOwnNewConnectionIdEmits for the writer to emit.
- QuicConnection.issueOwnReplacementSourceCidLocked() — top-up
after each peer RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID so the pool stays at
full capacity for repeated migrations.
- QuicConnectionWriter — once handshakeConfirmed flips, calls
issueOwnConnectionIdsLocked with `peer.activeConnectionIdLimit
- 1` (cap 7); drains pendingOwnNewConnectionIdEmits as fresh
NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames; the existing pendingNewConnectionId
map continues to handle loss-recovery retransmits.
- applyPeerRetireConnectionIdLocked — three cases: in-pool seq
is freed and replaced; below-next-seq missing seq is benign
retransmit; above-next-seq is PROTOCOL_VIOLATION (peer
retiring something we never advertised).
Verified against the live interop runner:
- quic-go rebind-port: 2/2 (was 0/N — Task 2). Now passes in ~64s.
- quic-go rebind-addr: 2/2 (was 0/N). Now passes in ~125-138s.
- picoquic rebind-port: 2/2.
- picoquic rebind-addr: 1/2 (flaky — separate investigation;
one run the connection migrates correctly, the other times
out at 110s; not blocking the rebind-port / quic-go win).
- picoquic connectionmigration: 0/2 still failing (the runner's
"active migration" testcase exercises a more sophisticated
migration shape — TBD; tracked separately).
Tests: IssuedSourceConnectionIdTest (5 cases pinning the
post-handshake emission, peer-RETIRE replacement, retransmit
tolerance, and protocol-violation closure for above-next-seq retires).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
RFC 9002 §6.2.2 says the consecutive-PTO count goes up by exactly
ONE per PTO timer expiry, so the §6.2.1 backoff is `pto_base * 2^count`
per firing. Pre-fix, the count incremented THREE times per firing:
1. inside `handlePtoFired` itself,
2. inside `requeueInflightForProbe` (which `handlePtoFired` calls),
3. again from the send loop's between-probe re-requeue (RFC §6.2.4
two-packet probe budget calls `requeueInflightForProbe` a
second time).
That made the effective backoff `2^(3*N)` per firing — 1×, 8×, 64×
of pto_base. With pto_base ≈ 150 ms post-handshake, PTO #3 didn't
fire until ~11 s post-handshake, well past the 5 s amp-limited
idle timeout strict servers (quic-go) enforce.
Quic-go's `amplificationlimit` testcase exposed this. The sim
drops client packets 2–7. Our PTO #2 second probe is packet #8
— the first one that gets through. With correct 1× increment
per PTO, packet #8 reaches the server in ~900 ms; pre-fix it
arrived at ~12 s, after quic-go had already destroyed the
connection ("Amplification window limited" → "Destroying
connection: timeout: no recent network activity"). Same root
cause for `handshakeloss` flakiness against quic-go (multiconnect
under 30% loss can't recover within the 30 s per-iteration
budget when PTO ramps to 64× by iteration 3).
Fix:
- Move the count increment to the top of `handlePtoFired`,
before it calls `requeueInflightForProbe`. The threshold
check inside the latter (RFC 9000 §9 — trigger
PATH_PROBE_PTO_THRESHOLD migration) reads the
post-increment value, preserving the prior 2-PTO-firing
trigger semantics.
- Remove the count increment from `requeueInflightForProbe`.
The send loop's between-probe re-requeue stays a no-op for
the count (same PTO firing).
Tests: PtoCryptoRetransmitTest.consecutivePtoCountAdvancesByOnePerPtoFiringNotPerProbePacket
pins the contract (full handlePtoFired → drain → re-requeue →
drain → handlePtoFired sequence; asserts count after each step).
Verified end-to-end against the live interop runner:
- amplificationlimit vs quic-go: 5/5 (was 0/3 — consistent
30 s timeout). Now passes in ~7 s.
- handshakeloss vs quic-go: 5/5 (was 2/3 — flaky multiconnect
iteration timeouts). Now consistently ~30 s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-fix, [QuicConnection.initiateKeyUpdate] only checked that 1-RTT
keys were installed — which fires when the TLS handshake derives
Finished, well before HANDSHAKE_DONE arrives. RFC 9001 §6.1 + §4.1.2
require the CLIENT to consider the handshake confirmed (HANDSHAKE_DONE
received) before rolling KEY_PHASE; quinn / quic-go / picoquic
correctly close the connection with PROTOCOL_VIOLATION ("illegal
packet: key update error") when an early update arrives.
The interop runner's keyupdate testcase against quinn flushed this:
the client polled `status == CONNECTED` (which flips on TLS Finished
via `onHandshakeComplete`) and called `initiateKeyUpdate()` before
HANDSHAKE_DONE landed. ~33% repro rate; the rest of the runs HANDSHAKE_DONE
happened to arrive in the gap between the status check and the
update.
Fix:
- Add `QuicConnection.handshakeConfirmed: Boolean` flipped only by
the parser when a HANDSHAKE_DONE frame is processed.
- Add `awaitHandshakeConfirmed()` for callers that need the
spec-confirmed state.
- Gate `initiateKeyUpdate()` on `handshakeConfirmed` (returns
false otherwise — same shape as the existing app-keys-not-yet
branch).
- Tighten `triggerPathMigrationLocked` to also gate on
`handshakeConfirmed` (RFC 9000 §9.1: same confirmation
requirement). Pre-fix it gated on `handshakeComplete`, which
flips at TLS-Finished too.
- InteropClient's keyupdate flow now waits on
`awaitHandshakeConfirmed` (with a 2s upper bound) rather than
polling `status == CONNECTED`.
The test fixture in ConnectedClientFixture.newConnectedClient now
delivers HANDSHAKE_DONE by default — most tests want the
production "fully ready" state. New `deliverHandshakeDone = false`
parameter for tests that need to exercise the pre-confirmation
window (KeyUpdateClientInitiatedTest).
Tests:
- KeyUpdateClientInitiatedTest:
initiateKeyUpdateBeforeHandshakeDoneIsRejectedAndDoesNotRotateKeys
initiateKeyUpdateAfterHandshakeDoneRotatesBothDirections
awaitHandshakeConfirmedSuspendsUntilHandshakeDone
triggerPathMigrationBeforeHandshakeDoneReturnsNotConnected
Verified against the live interop runner — 5/5 against quinn,
3/3 against quic-go, 3/3 against picoquic (pre-fix: ~33% pass rate
against quinn).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-fix, PathValidator.checkValidationTimeout queued a
RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID for the failed sequence number while leaving
QuicConnection.destinationConnectionId stamping that same CID. The
strict servers (quic-go / picoquic / msquic / mvfst) processed the
RETIRE, dropped their routing entry, then closed us with
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION the next time a packet arrived stamped with
the just-retired CID — visible in qlog as two RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID
frames within ~500 ms followed by "retired connection ID N, which
was used as the Destination Connection ID on this packet".
Reproducer: setting proactiveDcidRotationMillis=4_000L on
QuicConnection drove the trigger every 4 s; rebind-port vs quic-go
then failed at ~10 s with the close above. Reverted in this commit;
the experiment fields are gone.
The fix splits the timeout outcome into three cases:
- NotTimedOut — budget hasn't elapsed.
- RecoveredOnSpare — rotated active to the lowest spare CID;
queued RETIRE for the failed seq; the
QuicConnection wrapper synchronously
updates destinationConnectionId so the
next outbound stamps the new CID, atomic
under streamsLock with the validator
state change.
- StuckOnFailedCid — no spare available; KEEP the failed seq
active and DO NOT queue retire. The
writer keeps stamping the unvalidated
CID; if the path is genuinely dead the
connection idles out, and once a
NEW_CONNECTION_ID arrives the next
trigger rotates cleanly.
After the fix, rebind-port vs quic-go fails at the 60 s test
timeout with server-side trigger=idle_timeout (the Task 2 issue —
strict servers gate on fresh DCID at new src port, which we can't
synchronize with the sim's rebind cadence) instead of the
PROTOCOL_VIOLATION close.
Tests:
- PathValidatorTest:
validationTimeoutAfter3PtoTransitionsToFailedAndRetiresFailedCidWithSpare
timeoutWithoutSpareKeepsFailedSeqActiveAndDoesNotRetire
twoConsecutiveFailedValidationsRetireAllAbandonedSequencesWithSpare
- ClientPathMigrationTest:
backToBackSuccessfulMigrationsRetireExactlyOnePerRotationAndStampNewDcid
validationTimeoutWithSpareRotatesDcidAndRetiresFailedSeq
validationTimeoutWithoutSpareKeepsActiveCidAndDoesNotRetire
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Surface a few code-quality wins surfaced by the simplify pass on the
moq-lite Lite-03/04 audit. All semantic-preserving; tests untouched
in behavior.
- **Derive `MoqLiteSession.version` from `transport.negotiatedSubProtocol`**
instead of carrying it as a separate constructor parameter. The
version was already redundant with the transport's negotiated
ALPN; deriving it eliminates the parameter on
`MoqLiteSession.client(...)` and the `resolveMoqLiteVersion()` /
`moqVersion` plumbing in `connectNestsListener` /
`connectNestsSpeaker`. Tests drive the version via
`FakeWebTransport.pair(negotiatedSubProtocol = …)`, which already
plumbs through to the session's derivation.
- **Extract `MoqLiteSession.rejectSubscribe(bidi, errorCode, reason)`**
helper that writes a `SubscribeDrop` body and `RESET_STREAM`s the
bidi. Both Subscribe-rejection arms (`BROADCAST_DOES_NOT_EXIST`
and `TRACK_DOES_NOT_EXIST`) now share this helper instead of
duplicating the runCatching / write / reset shape. Future drop
codes plug in without growing the duplication.
- **Make `StrippedWtStream.stopSending` non-nullable.** The demux
always wires it (every surfaced stream has a read side), so the
`?:` "defensive" fallbacks in `StrippedWtReadStreamAdapter` and
`StrippedWtBidiStreamAdapter` were dead code. Tightens the
`StrippedWtStream` contract and shrinks the adapters.
- **Extract `SEQ_BITS=23` / `SEQ_MASK=0x007F_FFFF` / `SEQ_MAX`
constants** in `MoqLiteSession.openGroupStream`. The bit-pack
formula now reads as `(trackPriority and 0xFF) shl SEQ_BITS) or
(sequence and SEQ_MASK)` — layout is named, not derived from the
hex literals scattered through the body.
Items deferred (noted but not done):
- `handleInboundBidi` arm extraction — the per-arm variable capture
(`dispatched`, `inboundSub`, `inboundSubPublisher`,
`inboundAnnouncePublisher`) makes a clean refactor harder than
the readability win. Defer until a future feature changes the
dispatch shape and the refactor falls out naturally.
- `Fake{Bidi,Read}Stream` / `ChannelWriteStream` constructor
parameter explosion — the cells-as-nullable-named-params shape
is already readable; the candidate `FakeStreamSignals` struct
would force a left/right-direction flag on the bidi side, which
is uglier than the explicit `myReset` / `peerReset` naming.
- `MoqLiteCodec` `object` → versioned `class` — the
`version: MoqLiteVersion = LITE_03` parameter on each method is
the idiomatic Kotlin shape for an optional-with-default
discriminator; converting to a class would bind state to
instances and complicate the test path that exercises both
versions per-call.
- `announce()` / `probe()` pump abstraction — borderline; the
embedded logging + tracing in `announce()` would have to be
parameterized into the abstraction. Worth revisiting if a third
similar pump appears.
- `MoqLiteSubscribeDropCode` / `MoqLiteStreamCancelCode` sealed-
class refactor — `Long` constants match the wire shape; sealed
types would force conversion at every API boundary
(codec accepts `Long`, transport accepts `Long`).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Pre-fix, the M1 priority pack `((trackPriority and 0xFF) shl 24)`
would set bit 31 whenever `trackPriority >= 0x80`, producing a
negative `Int`. `QuicConnectionWriter.sortedByDescending { it.priority }`
sorts via signed `Int.compareTo`, so negative-signed values land
BELOW every positive priority — exactly inverting the intended
"higher trackPriority drains first" ordering.
The default `DEFAULT_TRACK_PRIORITY = 0x80` sits exactly on this
boundary, so this would have hit production the moment a hand-
tuned `trackPriority=0xFF` (highest intended) appeared in any
multi-track scenario.
Reshape the layout to keep bit 31 clear:
bit 31 : 0 (reserved as the sign bit)
bits 30..23 : trackPriority u8 (0..255)
bits 22..0 : sequence low 23 bits (~97 days at 1 grp/sec)
The trackPriority byte still occupies an 8-bit slot, just shifted
one bit lower. Sequence saturation moves from 24 bits (≈ 6 days)
to 23 bits (≈ 97 days) — still ample for the 9-minute JWT refresh
cycle.
Two regression tests:
- The existing `publisher_packs_trackPriority_and_sequence_into_setPriority_value`
is updated to assert the new bit layout AND that the encoded
value is non-negative.
- New `publisher_priority_pack_keeps_top_trackPriority_above_lower_trackPriority`
is the direct guard against the bug: `trackPriority=0xFF`
must encode HIGHER than `trackPriority=0x7F`. Pre-fix this
test fails with `0xFF` encoding to a negative Int below the
positive `0x7F` encoding; post-fix both are positive and
correctly ordered.
Surfaced by the merge-prep security review of the moq-lite
Lite-03/04 audit branch — agent flagged it as "QoS/correctness
not security, excluded by DoS rule" but it's a real bug worth
fixing before merge.
Audit doc updated: bit layout in `nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md`
(M1 + L4 entries).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Adds Fix#6 (L2 — SubscribeOk narrowing), Fix#7 (L3 —
subscriber-driven Probe API), and Fix#8 (L1 — version-aware
Lite-03/04 codec + ALPN negotiation) to the compliance audit
document. Updates the gap matrix (L1/L2/L3 → ✅) and the TL;DR
(now reads "nine shipped fixes + M6 closed; every gap is now
resolved, no items remain deferred").
The "what's deliberately deferred" section now lists only the
external follow-up — a `kixelated/moq` feature request
suggesting per-deployment tuning of moq-rs's per-subscriber
forward-queue starvation behavior. That's an upstream-relay
concern, not a moq-lite gap.
Updates the audio-rooms completion-plan pointer to reflect the
shipped count and the absence of remaining deferrals. Audit doc
title acknowledges Lite-04 alongside Lite-03 since the codec
now speaks both.
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Lite-03 audit L1: completes the moq-lite version surface so the
session speaks the wire-format version the server picks via
WebTransport ALPN negotiation. Pre-fix the codec hardcoded Lite-03;
advertising `moq-lite-04` was a footgun because a Lite-04-preferring
relay would desync on the very first Announce exchange.
Verified diff between Lite-03 and Lite-04 by WebFetching kixelated's
Rust reference (`rs/moq-lite/src/lite/{announce,subscribe,probe}.rs`,
`rs/moq-lite/src/version.rs`, `rs/moq-lite/src/model/origin.rs`):
exactly three fields differ; everything else is byte-identical.
- `Announce.hops`: Lite-03 wire = single varint count (the spec
explicitly fills with `Origin::UNKNOWN` placeholders on decode);
Lite-04 wire = `varint(count) + count × varint(originId)` (the
`OriginList`). MAX_HOPS = 32.
- `AnnouncePlease.excludeHop`: Lite-03 absent; Lite-04 single
varint after `prefix`. Sentinel `0` = no exclusion.
- `Probe.rtt`: Lite-03 absent; Lite-04 single varint after
`bitrate`. Sentinel `0` = unknown (decoded as null). Outgoing
`Some(0)` is clamped to `Some(1)` to avoid colliding with the
sentinel — mirrors kixelated's `encode_msg` clamp.
New surface:
- `MoqLiteVersion` enum (LITE_03, LITE_04) with `fromAlpn` lookup.
- `MoqLiteCodec.{encode,decode}{AnnouncePlease,Announce,Probe}`
take `version: MoqLiteVersion = LITE_03` parameter, branch on
it. Default LITE_03 keeps existing call sites compiling.
- `MoqLiteSession.client(transport, scope, version)` carries the
version through every codec invocation.
- `MoqLiteAnnouncePlease.excludeHop: Long = 0L` (default).
- `MoqLiteAnnounce.hops: List<Long>` (was `Long`) — list of
origin IDs, bounded to MAX_HOPS=32. Existing call sites
migrate `hops = 0L` → `hops = emptyList()`, `hops = 7L` →
`hops = List(7) { 0L }`.
- `MoqLiteProbe.rtt: Long? = null` (default).
Negotiation:
- `WebTransportSession.negotiatedSubProtocol: String?` exposes
the server's `wt-protocol` selection. `QuicWebTransportFactory`
parses the response HEADERS, extracts the SF-string from
`wt-protocol`, and threads it into `QuicWebTransportSession`.
`FakeWebTransport.pair(negotiatedSubProtocol = …)` lets tests
drive the same path.
- Default advertised list now `[moq-lite-04, moq-lite-03]` (was
`[moq-lite-03]`). Lite-04 sits first to match kixelated's
preference; servers that don't support it fall back to
Lite-03 cleanly.
- `connectNestsListener` / `connectNestsSpeaker` resolve the
version via `resolveMoqLiteVersion(webTransport.negotiatedSubProtocol)`
and pass it to `MoqLiteSession.client(...)`. Falls back to
Lite-03 when the server doesn't echo `wt-protocol` (older
deployments) or echoes something unrecognised (forward-compat).
- New `MOQ_LITE_04_VERSION = 0x6D71_6C04L` synthetic version
code; `versionCode(version)` mapping function.
Regression tests (all green):
- `MoqLiteCodecTest.announcePlease_lite04_round_trips_excludeHop`
- `MoqLiteCodecTest.announcePlease_lite03_omits_excludeHop_on_wire`
- `MoqLiteCodecTest.announce_lite04_round_trips_full_origin_list`
- `MoqLiteCodecTest.announce_lite03_drops_origin_ids_keeps_count`
- `MoqLiteCodecTest.announce_decoder_rejects_oversize_hop_count`
(MAX_HOPS bounds check)
- `MoqLiteCodecTest.probe_lite04_round_trips_rtt`
- `MoqLiteCodecTest.probe_lite04_clamps_some_zero_to_one_to_avoid_unknown_sentinel`
- `MoqLiteCodecTest.probe_lite04_decodes_zero_rtt_as_null`
- `MoqLiteCodecTest.probe_lite03_wire_omits_rtt`
- `MoqLiteSessionTest.lite04_announce_round_trips_full_origin_list_through_session`
(end-to-end Lite-04 session)
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (L1).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Lite-03 audit L3: completes the subscriber-side Probe surface to
mirror kixelated's `Subscriber::run_probe_stream`
(`rs/moq-lite/src/lite/subscriber.rs`).
`MoqLiteSession.probe()` opens a bidi, writes
`ControlType::Probe` (varint 4), and returns a `MoqLiteProbeHandle`
whose `updates` flow yields each size-prefixed `MoqLiteProbe`
message the publisher pushes. The handle's `close()` FINs the
bidi and cancels the pump.
`updates` is a `MutableSharedFlow(replay=8)` so a collector that
attaches after the publisher's first emit doesn't miss it
(matches the same shape the announce-watch uses).
No production consumer for the API today — Amethyst's nests
listener doesn't run ABR on a fixed-rate Opus encoder. The API
exists to round out the moq-lite Lite-03 surface: a diagnostic
tool can now read a publisher's bitrate without subscribing to
its data track.
The publisher-side handler (existing) was already correct: it
writes one `MoqLiteProbe` (32 kbps Opus voice hint) and FINs.
Regression test:
`MoqLiteSessionTest.subscriber_probe_writes_control_type_and_decodes_publisher_bitrate`.
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (L3).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Lite-03 audit L2: when accepting a SUBSCRIBE, the publisher MAY
narrow the subscriber's `startGroup` / `endGroup` request bounds.
Pre-fix we always echoed `null/null`, which lost the diagnostic
"which group am I about to start sending?" information — particularly
useful for hot-swap continuations where the publisher's
[MoqLitePublisherHandle.nextSequence] is non-zero (the seeded
`startSequence` from the previous moq-lite session).
The fix narrows `startGroup` to `targetPublisher.nextSequence`. The
subscriber decodes this as "the next group on this subscription
will be sequence N" and can log / surface the join-point. `endGroup`
stays null because live audio rooms have no end in sight; the
subscriber's request bound is honoured implicitly when the publisher
closes.
Regression test:
`MoqLiteSessionTest.publisher_subscribeOk_narrows_startGroup_to_next_sequence`.
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (L2).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Adds Fix#5 (M2 + M3 — STOP_SENDING for single-group cancel +
RESET_STREAM with typed code on Drop replies) to the compliance
audit doc. The two items shipped together because the plumbing is
shared — extending `:quic`'s StrippedWtStream with reset/stopSending
closures, extending the WebTransport interfaces, and routing through
all adapters was the prerequisite for both.
Updates the gap matrix (M2 + M3 → ✅), the TL;DR (now reads "six
shipped fixes + M6 closed; no 🟡 items remain open"), and the
deferred-items list (only L1 / L2 / L3 remain, all 🟦 with explicit
rationale).
Updates the audio-rooms completion-plan pointer with the new
shipped count.
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Lite-03 audit M2: when a group's uni stream arrives for a
`subscribeId` whose subscription has already been removed (typical
case: listener canceled / unsubscribed before the publisher
observed it), the listener MUST signal the publisher to abandon
in-flight retransmits via `STOP_SENDING(applicationErrorCode)` on
that uni stream. Pre-fix, `drainOneGroup` silently dropped every
frame (`droppedNoSub++`) and let the publisher keep pushing until
natural FIN — wasted bandwidth on bytes the listener would discard,
plus relay queue pressure on the per-subscriber forward pipeline
that already sits behind the production stream-cliff.
Wire the latched `stopSending(MoqLiteStreamCancelCode.SUBSCRIPTION_GONE)`
on the first frame that observes `sub == null`. Latched (one-shot)
so concurrent frames in the same drain don't re-fire — RFC 9000
§3.5 says subsequent STOP_SENDINGs are ignored anyway, but it saves
the syscall and keeps the trace clean.
New error-code constant `MoqLiteStreamCancelCode.SUBSCRIPTION_GONE
= 0x10L` lives next to `MoqLiteSubscribeDropCode` in
`MoqLiteMessages.kt`. moq-lite leaves application error codes
undefined; we follow the same "small non-zero varint" convention.
Test seam: `ChannelWriteStream` is now a public class (was
private) with a `peerStopSendingCode` accessor, so a test that
holds the writer side (`serverSide.openUniStream() as
ChannelWriteStream`) can assert the listener's stopSending code
without racing for the peer-side `FakeReadStream` reference.
Regression test:
`MoqLiteSessionTest.listener_stopSending_group_uni_when_subscription_already_canceled`.
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (M2).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
moq-lite Lite-03 conveys application-level errors on any stream via
`RESET_STREAM(application_error_code u32)` (audit M3). Pre-fix, our
publisher's two SubscribeDrop reply paths
(`BROADCAST_DOES_NOT_EXIST`, `TRACK_DOES_NOT_EXIST`) wrote the Drop
body and then `bidi.finish()` — a graceful FIN — which overlapped
with "publisher gracefully shut down." A subscriber watching only
the QUIC layer (no body decode) couldn't tell rejection from
shutdown.
Replace the trailing `bidi.finish()` with `bidi.reset(errorCode)`
in both Drop paths. The errorCode matches the body's `errorCode`
field so a peer that decodes the Drop sees the same number as one
that only sees the RESET_STREAM frame. The plumbing landed in the
prior commit (`feat(quic,nestsclient): plumb RESET_STREAM +
STOP_SENDING through WebTransport`).
Tests: existing `publisher_replies_subscribeDrop_when_*` regressions
gain an additional `lastPeerResetCode` assertion via
`FakeBidiStream`, locking the typed-error contract.
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (M3).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Extends the WebTransport interface and its three implementations
(QUIC-backed, in-memory fake, peer-stripped demux) with typed
error-code cancel paths so moq-lite Lite-03's M2/M3 audit items can
land.
QUIC layer (`:quic`):
- `StrippedWtStream` gains optional `reset` and `stopSending`
closures, wired by `WtPeerStreamDemux.emitStripped` through
`QuicStream.resetStream(errorCode)` /
`QuicStream.stopSending(errorCode)` + `driver.wakeup()` so the
frames actually leave the connection. `reset` is null on
peer-initiated uni streams (no send half on our side);
`stopSending` is unconditional (every surfaced stream has a
read side).
WebTransport interface (`:nestsClient`):
- `WebTransportReadStream.stopSending(errorCode: Long)` —
suspending; first-call-wins.
- `WebTransportWriteStream.reset(errorCode: Long)` —
suspending; first-call-wins. Distinct from the existing
graceful `finish()` / FIN.
Adapters:
- `QuicBidiStreamAdapter`, `QuicReadStreamAdapter`,
`QuicUniWriteStreamAdapter` route directly to the underlying
`QuicStream` API.
- `StrippedWtReadStreamAdapter` /
`StrippedWtBidiStreamAdapter` route through the demux's
closures; defensive `?:` fallbacks defend against a future
demux bug that forgets to wire a closure.
- `FakeBidiStream`, `FakeReadStream`, `ChannelWriteStream` (the
in-memory test transport) record reset / stopSending codes
in shared `AtomicLong` cells so tests can assert "the peer
reset with code X" / "the listener stopSending with code Y"
via new `lastResetCode` / `lastStopSendingCode` /
`lastPeerResetCode` / `lastPeerStopSendingCode` properties.
Sentinel `NO_CODE = Long.MIN_VALUE` distinguishes "not called"
from a legitimate code 0.
Pure plumbing — no moq-lite call sites use the new methods yet.
Subsequent commits wire M3 (publisher Drop reply uses
reset(errorCode)) and M2 (listener group-cancel uses
stopSending(errorCode)).
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (M2 + M3).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Adds Fix#3 (M1 — trackPriority + sequence bit-pack matching kixelated
PriorityHandle), Fix#4 (L5 — fresh publisher list at dispatch
time), and the M6 closure (verified via WebFetch that Goaway has no
body schema in moq-lite Lite-03 — `rs/moq-lite/src/lite/{stream,
client}.rs`; our recognise/log/FIN handler is canonical) to the
compliance audit document.
Also marks L4 closed (subsumed by M1 — the saturating cast guard
collapsed into the per-track high byte logic).
Updates the audio-rooms completion-plan pointer with the new shipped
count: four publisher-side spec tightenings + one closure (M6) +
five 🟡 / 🟦 items explicitly deferred with rationale.
Remaining deferrals: M2 + M3 (need WebTransport/`:quic` interface
extension, locked per audit prompt), L1 (Lite-04 codec rewrite, no
relay forces it), L2 + L3 (no consumer for the API).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
`handleInboundBidi` previously snapshotted the publisher list at the
TOP of the function (= bidi-arrival time) and used the snapshot for
the rest of the bidi's lifetime. A publisher registered between
bidi-open and the first inbound chunk would miss the dispatcher's
view, even though the publisher was already live in `activePublishers`
by the time we needed to dispatch.
Practical impact today: zero — both nests publishers (`audio/data`
and `catalog.json`) register from `MoqLiteNestsSpeaker.startBroadcasting`
before the relay's SUBSCRIBE bidi for either track lands. The
~few-ms gap is below the network round-trip floor.
But the contract is narrower if we read the list at first-byte time:
we then see every publisher that was registered up to the moment we
needed to make a routing decision. Closes the L5 row of the audit doc.
Move the publishers fetch from the function-top to inside the
`if (!dispatched)` block, after the control-type byte has been read.
On empty publisher list (the case we previously short-circuited at
function-top), we now FIN cleanly so the peer's wait resolves
instead of hanging on an idle bidi.
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (L5).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Per moq-lite Lite-03 (kixelated/moq `rs/moq-lite/src/lite/priority.rs`),
`Publisher::serve_group` calls `priority.insert(track.priority,
sequence)` and feeds the resulting position into `stream.set_priority`.
Priority sorts first by `track.priority u8` (higher track = drains
ahead under congestion), then by group `sequence` within a track
(newer = drains ahead).
Pre-fix we passed raw `sequence.toInt()` directly to setPriority,
ignoring the per-track byte. For our single-Opus-track production case
this was unobservable — newer-first ordering held by sequence
monotonicity — but a future multi-track broadcast (audio + companion
catalog / status track) would have starved the lower-rate track the
moment audio's outbound queue got congested.
Fix: add `trackPriority: Int = DEFAULT_TRACK_PRIORITY` parameter to
`MoqLiteSession.publish()`, store on PublisherStateImpl, and bit-pack
in `openGroupStream`:
bits 31..24 trackPriority u8 (0..255)
bits 23..0 sequence low 24 bits
The 24-bit sequence window is ample (≈ 6 days at 1 group/sec, beyond
which all newer groups within a single track tie — but they still
beat older groups of any LOWER-priority track via the top byte).
Production sessions cycle on JWT refresh every 9 min, so the wrap is
defensive only.
`DEFAULT_TRACK_PRIORITY = 0x80` matches the existing subscriber-side
DEFAULT_PRIORITY midpoint, so all existing call sites keep their
prior behavior.
Test seam: `FakeWebTransport.openUniStream` now records the most-
recent `setPriority` value via a shared `AtomicInteger` cell that the
peer-side `FakeReadStream` exposes as `lastSetPriority`. Lets the new
regression test verify the bit-pack formula on the actual peer-side
read stream rather than peeking into private state.
Regression test:
`MoqLiteSessionTest.publisher_packs_trackPriority_and_sequence_into_setPriority_value`.
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (M1).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Records the cross-spec compliance audit of the moq-lite Lite-03
implementation against kixelated's reference Rust impl
(github.com/kixelated/moq, rs/moq-lite/). Methodology mirrors the
recent QUIC RFC review: walked every Kotlin source under
`moq/lite/`, traced data flow speaker → relay → listener, and
cross-referenced each on-wire message + control byte against the
Rust reference.
Outcome: no 🔴 wire-incompatibilities found. Every codec primitive —
control type discriminators, AnnouncePlease, Announce, Subscribe
(incl. the `Option<u64>` off-by-one and `Duration` millis-as-varint
conventions), SubscribeOk/Drop with the type-outside-size-prefix
framing peculiar to Lite-03, GroupHeader, Probe — matches byte-for-
byte.
Six 🟡 (spec-loose / future-fragile) and four 🟦 (diagnostic /
observability) gaps documented:
- M1 stream priority parity vs kixelated's PriorityHandle
(single-track Opus impact: invisible)
- M2 STOP_SENDING for single-group cancel not exposed
- M3 RESET_STREAM with Error::to_code not used
- M4 AnnouncePlease prefix-mismatch falsely emits Active — fixed
in 6c2d7efc
- M5 inbound Subscribe doesn't validate broadcast field — fixed
in 3dcee2a4
- M6 Goaway body / migration handler
Also references the new audit from `2026-04-26-audio-rooms-completion.md`
so future readers find it via the completion-plan pointer.
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
The publisher-side dispatcher in handleInboundBidi previously matched
inbound Subscribe bidis on `track` only, never checking whether the
requested `broadcast` field matched the suffix our publisher claimed
on this session. A peer (or buggy relay) could open a Subscribe under
broadcast="otherPubkey" track="audio/data" and we would route OUR
audio frames to them — the dispatcher only filtered on track.
Production never bit because moq-rs's relay routes Subscribe messages
to the specific publisher whose broadcast matches the requested path
upstream of us, so an off-target broadcast never landed on our
inbound bidi pump. But a peer-to-peer connection without a relay
in between would have been able to siphon our audio under any
broadcast string they invented.
The fix: validate `sub.broadcast == publisher.suffix` (both already
path-normalised by the codec) before track matching. On mismatch,
reply `SubscribeDrop(errorCode=BROADCAST_DOES_NOT_EXIST,
reasonPhrase="<requested> not published on this session
(we publish <ours>)")` and FIN. New error code
`MoqLiteSubscribeDropCode.BROADCAST_DOES_NOT_EXIST = 0x05L` mirrors
the IETF MoQ-transport `TRACK_NAMESPACE_DOES_NOT_EXIST` semantic so
a watcher can tell apart "wrong room" from "wrong rendition".
Regression test:
`MoqLiteSessionTest.publisher_replies_subscribeDrop_when_broadcast_does_not_match`.
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (M5).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
Per moq-lite Lite-03 (kixelated/moq `rs/moq-lite/src/lite/announce.rs`),
a publisher MUST only emit `Announce(Active)` for broadcasts whose path
starts with the requested AnnouncePlease prefix. Pre-fix, when
`MoqLitePath.stripPrefix(please.prefix, ourSuffix)` returned `null`, we
fell through to `?: announcePublisher.suffix` and emitted Active under
our full suffix anyway, falsely advertising the broadcast under a
prefix the subscriber didn't request.
Production never bit because the relay always opens its announce bidi
to us with `prefix=""` (which always matches), but a future peer-to-
peer or namespace-scoped subscriber would have observed a ghost
broadcast under whatever prefix they asked about.
The fix: if `stripPrefix` returns `null`, FIN the bidi cleanly without
writing any Announce body. The subscriber sees an empty announce
stream and moves on.
Regression test:
`MoqLiteSessionTest.publisher_skips_announce_when_announce_please_prefix_does_not_match`.
Audit doc: nestsClient/plans/2026-05-09-moq-lite-rfc-compliance.md (M4).
https://claude.ai/code/session_012TGfo99Ugz7fcCPv85a8Tq
The remaining 🟦 cosmetic items from the 2026-05-09 audit. Pre-fix the
connection's `closeErrorCode` was effectively unused — TLS handshake
failures bubbled up as generic `QuicCodecException` and observers had
to grep the reason string for the spec category. Now closeErrorCode
carries the RFC 9000 §20.1 transport code or the RFC 9001 §4.8
TLS-alert-mapped CRYPTO_ERROR.
Implementation:
* `TlsAlertException(alertCode, message)` carrier raised by the
TLS layer for the well-defined cases:
- HelloRetryRequest received (handshake_failure = 40)
- TLS 1.3 not negotiated (protocol_version = 70)
- Unsupported cipher (illegal_parameter = 47)
- ALPN mismatch (no_application_protocol = 120)
- Cert chain validation failure (bad_certificate = 42)
- CertificateVerify signature failure (decrypt_error = 51)
- Server Finished MAC mismatch (decrypt_error = 51)
- TLS KeyUpdate over QUIC (unexpected_message = 10) — RFC 9001
§6 mandates this specific code; fixes the misleading prior
message that said "rotation not implemented" (we DO implement
QUIC's own KEY_PHASE-bit rotation).
The QUIC parser maps `0x100 + alertCode` per RFC 9001 §4.8 and
stamps `closeErrorCode`.
* `QuicTransportError` constants object covering the RFC 9000 §20.1
table (NO_ERROR through NO_VIABLE_PATH including the previously-
flagged CRYPTO_BUFFER_EXCEEDED 0x0d, KEY_UPDATE_ERROR 0x0e,
AEAD_LIMIT_REACHED 0x0f).
* `markClosedExternally(reason, errorCode = NO_ERROR)` overload —
backward compatible; lets call sites pin the spec code on
`closeErrorCode` for qlog observability without changing the
wire-emit semantics (still no CONNECTION_CLOSE frame, same as
before — that's a separate, larger refactor).
* RFC 9000 §22 CRYPTO_BUFFER_EXCEEDED enforcement — pre-insert
per-level cap of 64 KiB on inbound CRYPTO data. Generous enough
for an RSA-4096 cert chain with intermediates; bounds the
worst-case heap a misbehaving peer can pin to 192 KiB across
all 3 encryption levels. Fires before the receive buffer
actually allocates.
* INVALID_TOKEN — N/A for client role (only servers validate Retry
tokens). KEY_UPDATE_ERROR — exposed as a constant; no current
failure path maps to it (PN regression on a key-update packet
is spec-allowed to handle silently per RFC 9001 §6.1, which we
do).
Tests: `ErrorCodeMappingTest` (6 cases) covers TlsAlertException
construction + offset, alert code bounds, markClosedExternally
preservation, CRYPTO_BUFFER_EXCEEDED close, sanity-check that small
CRYPTO frames don't trip the cap, and §20.1 numeric values.
`HelloRetryRequestTest` updated to expect TlsAlertException(40)
instead of generic QuicCodecException.
Plan updated to mark the §4.8 + §22 (CRYPTO_BUFFER_EXCEEDED) items
resolved; KEY_UPDATE_ERROR documented as TLS-side covered + QUIC-side
spec-allowed-silent; INVALID_TOKEN documented as N/A for client.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01XGmmaVuy2wsSZQx2AqN2ik
Two related improvements for the audio-rooms moq-lite path on mobile.
** RFC 9114 §6.2.1 + RFC 9204 §4.2 critical-stream closure **
When the peer closes a critical unidirectional stream — control (0x00),
QPACK encoder (0x02), or QPACK decoder (0x03) — the spec MANDATES we
treat it as a connection error of type H3_CLOSED_CRITICAL_STREAM.
Pre-fix the demux only set `peerH3ProtocolError` flag on protocol
violations, with no autonomous close on clean FIN; the application
was expected to poll. For audio rooms running on lossy mobile paths,
relay-side control-stream drops left users staring at silent audio.
* `Http3ErrorCode` constants for the §8.1 error-code table.
* `WtPeerStreamDemux.drainControlStream` calls `connection.close(...)`
on either clean FIN (H3_CLOSED_CRITICAL_STREAM) or QuicCodecException
raised by the frame reader (specific code via
[http3ErrorCodeForMessage] map: H3_MISSING_SETTINGS,
H3_FRAME_UNEXPECTED, H3_SETTINGS_ERROR, H3_ID_ERROR, etc.).
* New `drainCriticalStream` helper fires the same close on QPACK
encoder / decoder FIN (RFC 9204 §4.2).
* Closure intent latched on `criticalStreamClosureCode` /
`criticalStreamClosureReason` so tests can verify the path runs
without wiring a real driver.
** RFC 9000 §10.3 stateless-reset tokens for migrated CIDs **
The 2026-05-09 stateless-reset detection covered tokens in the
unused-CID pool but lost them the moment a CID was rotated to active
via `tryStartValidation` (WiFi handoff) or `forceRotateToHigherSequence`
(peer-forced retire). On the new path the migrated token wouldn't
match — relay crash mid-handoff would silently hang until idle timeout.
* `PathValidator.knownStatelessResetTokens` — append-only lifetime
store, populated in `recordPeerNewConnectionId`. Survives rotation.
* `QuicConnection.isStatelessReset` walks the lifetime store instead
of the unused pool.
* §10.3.1 explicitly permits keeping tokens after retirement; cost
is ~16 bytes per peer-issued CID.
Tests:
* `CriticalStreamClosureTest` (5 cases) — control FIN, QPACK FIN,
MISSING_SETTINGS, FRAME_UNEXPECTED, idempotency.
* `StatelessResetDetectionTest` extended with 2 cases —
`token_persists_after_path_migration_for_wifi_handoff` and
`token_persists_through_force_rotation_for_acid_reissue`.
Plan updated: 🟦 H3_CLOSED_CRITICAL_STREAM resolved; the
"limitation: tokens for actively-used DCIDs we migrated to" caveat is
removed from the §10.3 entry and from known-limitations item #5.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01XGmmaVuy2wsSZQx2AqN2ik
- Merge nested if statements in marmot stores' delete() and in
ZoomableContentDialog's MediaUrl* gating block (S1066).
- Replace `if (cond) false else x` with `!cond && x` in
ImageVideoDescription's effectiveStripMetadata (S1125).
- Remove unused `nip95description` local in FileServerSelectionRow.
All changes are body-internal with identical behaviour.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Peer's CONNECTION_CLOSE now transitions the connection through DRAINING
for 3 * PTO before flipping to CLOSED, instead of going straight to
CLOSED. While DRAINING:
- the writer emits no packets (drainOutbound returns null);
- the parser drops late inbound silently at the top of feedDatagramInner;
- close()-awaiters unblock immediately via closingDrainSignal so the
transition isn't gated on the 3*PTO grace.
After 3 * PTO the driver's send-loop timer fires
markClosedExternally("draining period elapsed") which transitions to
CLOSED. The §10.2.2 grace period gives the peer's last retransmits a
chance to converge before we discard state.
Implementation:
* `Status.DRAINING` enum value with kdoc tying it to §10.2.2.
* `QuicConnection.drainingDeadlineMs` + `enterDraining(reason, nowMs)`
(sets status, computes `now + max(3*pto, MIN_DRAINING_PERIOD_MS)`,
completes closingDrainSignal, fires qlog) + `isDrainingExpired`.
* Parser's CONNECTION_CLOSE handler routes through `enterDraining`
instead of `markClosedExternally`.
* Driver folds `drainingDeadlineMs` into its send-loop sleep
`withTimeoutOrNull` and transitions to CLOSED on expiry.
* Writer short-circuits drainOutbound for DRAINING (returns null —
spec MUST NOT send).
* Parser drops late inbound at the top of feedDatagramInner.
Updated `FrameRoutingTest.connection_close_from_peer_short_circuits_remaining_frames`
to expect DRAINING (was CLOSED). Other status=CLOSED assertions in the
test suite cover OUR-side closes (markClosedExternally on protocol
violations / TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR / FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR) which
still go directly to CLOSED.
Test: `DrainingStateTest` (7 cases) covers the peer-close → DRAINING
transition, late-inbound drop, deadline math, the
MIN_DRAINING_PERIOD_MS floor, retransmit no-op semantics, and the
fresh-connection invariant.
Plan updated to mark all 🟡 Medium items resolved. The 2026-05-09
audit's complete spec-compliance close-out: 2 of 2 High + 6 of 6
Medium fixed in seven commits.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01XGmmaVuy2wsSZQx2AqN2ik
davotoula