7c7908d37332e9779cab92e40dac15820605005b
4 Commits
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7c7908d373 |
feat(relay): NIP-86 relay management API
Implements the operator-facing JSON-RPC admin protocol on the relay
side, layered on top of the existing NIP-98 HTTP-Auth + NIP-86 wire
types in :quartz. Same path as the NIP-01 WebSocket and NIP-11 GET —
HTTP POST with Content-Type application/nostr+json+rpc, gated by a
NIP-98 Authorization header signed by an operator-listed pubkey.
Architecture:
- BanStore — concurrent in-memory state for runtime
pubkey/event/kind ban + allow lists.
- DynamicBanPolicy — IRelayPolicy that consults BanStore on every
EVENT; auto-prepended to every Relay's policy
stack so admin actions take effect without a
restart.
- Nip98AuthVerifier — parses `Authorization: Nostr <base64-event>`,
verifies kind 27235 + Schnorr sig + ±60 s
clock skew + method/url/payload-hash match.
- Nip86Server — JSON-RPC dispatcher. Mutates BanStore for
ban/allow/list methods, mutates the live
RelayInfo doc for changerelayname/desc/icon
(Relay.info is now @Volatile var, mutation
through Relay.updateInfo).
- LocalRelayServer — adds POST handler at the relay path:
403 if no admin pubkeys configured,
401 if NIP-98 missing/invalid,
403 if signer's pubkey isn't on the admin list,
200 with Nip86Response otherwise.
- RelayConfig.AdminSection — `[admin].pubkeys = [...]` config key.
- RelayInfo.default() now advertises NIP-86 alongside 1/9/11/40/42/45/50/62.
Methods implemented:
supportedmethods, banpubkey, unbanpubkey, listbannedpubkeys,
allowpubkey, unallowpubkey, listallowedpubkeys,
banevent (also deletes from store), allowevent, listbannedevents,
allowkind, disallowkind, listallowedkinds,
changerelayname, changerelaydescription, changerelayicon.
Tests (28 new):
- BanStoreTest (6) — ban/allow round-trips, case-insensitive
pubkey match, kind allow/deny precedence,
audit-trail listing.
- Nip86ServerTest (8) — every method's accept/reject path.
- Nip98AuthVerifierTest (8) — happy path, missing/wrong scheme,
url/method/payload-hash mismatch,
stale created_at, wrong event kind.
- Nip86EndToEndTest (6) — real HTTP POST through LocalRelayServer:
supportedmethods returns 200,
outsider returns 403, no auth header
returns 401 + WWW-Authenticate, banpubkey
blocks subsequent EVENT publish over WS,
changerelayname flows to NIP-11 GET,
admin endpoint is disabled when no
pubkeys configured.
Total :quartz-relay tests: 87, 0 failures.
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9ebdfc0b81 |
feat(relay): drop max_event_bytes + rate-limit configs; verify on by default
Removes config keys + policies that don't earn their complexity:
- [limits].max_event_bytes / MaxEventBytesPolicy — duplicates
[limits].max_ws_frame_bytes which is the right layer (Ktor frame
cap at the wire), and the policy-level check ran AFTER the event
was already parsed and bound for the store.
- [limits].messages_per_sec, [limits].subscriptions_per_min /
RateLimitPolicy — per-session token buckets without the matching
per-IP / global-EPS infrastructure are mostly cosmetic; an
operator who needs real rate limits will use a reverse proxy.
Also flips [options].verify_signatures default from `false` to `true`.
A relay accepting traffic from real clients should verify Schnorr
signatures, and verify-by-default closes the footgun of forgetting
the flag. The CLI gains `--no-verify` for explicit opt-out
(test fixtures, mirror replays); the old `--verify` is dropped (a
no-op now anyway).
Removed:
- quartz-relay/.../policies/MaxEventBytesPolicy.kt
- quartz-relay/.../policies/RateLimitPolicy.kt
- 7 obsolete tests in PoliciesTest + 1 in PoliciesIntegrationTest
- The matching config fields in LimitsSection
- Sample config entries in config.example.toml
- Wiring in Main.composePolicy
Added:
- Test verifySignaturesCanBeExplicitlyDisabled covering the
new explicit-opt-out path.
Total :quartz-relay tests: 59, 0 failures.
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633d0c3c74 |
feat(relay): enforce [limits] + [authorization] config sections
Wires the parsed-but-unenforced config sections into actual relay
behavior via five new IRelayPolicy implementations under
quartz-relay/.../policies/. They compose through the existing
PolicyStack so operators stack only what they need; cheap rejection
paths run before expensive ones (rate-limit → AUTH → future/size/lists
→ signature verification).
New policies:
- KindAllowDenyPolicy — kind_whitelist + kind_blacklist
- PubkeyAllowDenyPolicy — pubkey_whitelist + pubkey_blacklist
(case-insensitive)
- RejectFutureEventsPolicy — options.reject_future_seconds
- MaxEventBytesPolicy — limits.max_event_bytes
(size of canonical NIP-01 JSON form)
- RateLimitPolicy — token-bucket per session for
messages_per_sec + subscriptions_per_min;
monotonic clock so wall-time jumps
don't reset buckets.
Plus:
- LocalRelayServer now honors limits.max_ws_frame_bytes /
limits.max_ws_message_bytes via Ktor's WebSockets.maxFrameSize.
- Main.kt builds the policy stack from RelayConfig in composePolicy().
Warning surface is reduced to only the three sections still
pending (max_subscriptions_per_session, max_filters_per_req,
network.remote_ip_header).
- PassThroughPolicy base lets each policy declare only the hook(s)
it actually enforces, keeping call sites readable.
Tests (20 new):
- PoliciesTest (16) — per-policy unit coverage for each accept/reject
boundary, including allow + deny precedence, case-insensitive pubkey
matching, deterministic rate-limit refill via injected clock, and
composition via IRelayPolicy.plus.
- PoliciesIntegrationTest (4) — end-to-end through NostrClient →
RelayHub → Relay; proves OK false comes back over the wire when
policies reject (kind blacklist, pubkey allow-list, future
timestamps, oversize events).
Total :quartz-relay tests: 62, 0 failures.
Also: bump Nip40 deleteExpiredEvents wait from 1500ms to 2500ms — the
previous margin was thin enough to flake on busy CI when the SQLite
unixepoch() rounds down across the wait.
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e214143def |
feat(relay): TOML config file (--config /path/to/relay.toml)
Adds operator-facing TOML configuration to :quartz-relay, with the
section layout deliberately mirroring nostr-rs-relay's config.toml so
existing operators can port across with little churn.
Sections parsed AND enforced today:
[info] — NIP-11 doc fields (name, description, contact, pubkey,
software, supported_nips, …); replaces the previous
hardcoded RelayInfo.default()
[network] — host, port, path
[database] — in_memory toggle + file path
[options] — verify_signatures, require_auth (compose to the right
IRelayPolicy stack)
Sections parsed today but NOT YET ENFORCED (forward-compat for the
upcoming rate-limit / authorization work — relay logs a warning when
they're set):
[limits] — max_event_bytes, messages_per_sec, …
[authorization] — pubkey_whitelist/blacklist, kind_whitelist/blacklist
[options].reject_future_seconds
[network].remote_ip_header
CLI flag precedence over the config file is preserved: --host, --port,
--path, --info, --db, --auth, --verify all override the matching field.
Adds:
- cc.ekblad:4koma 1.2.0 for TOML parsing
- quartz-relay/config.example.toml as the canonical operator reference
- 5 unit tests (defaults, full parse, NIP-11 mapping, bundled example
file, optional sections)
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