Edits across all 13 EGGs to remove implementer guesswork. After this an
implementer can build a listener and speaker without reading our source.
README:
- Conventions section: hex casing rule (lowercase, 64 chars, no 0x),
NIP-01 foundations, `a`-tag form, created_at tie-break, JSON / time.
- Joining sequence: numbered end-to-end walkthrough from `kind:30312`
to first audio frame, referencing each EGG.
EGG-01 (room event):
- `relays` tag is one tag with multiple values (not multi-tag).
- `service` URL trailing-slash normalization.
- `private` status: gate is implementation-defined, not "render as open".
- `d`-tag charset locked to [A-Za-z0-9._-] so it interpolates safely
into the moq-auth namespace.
- Relay-discovery rule: publish to `relays` tag ∪ NIP-65 outbox.
- Tie-break on identical created_at via smallest event id.
EGG-02 (auth):
- JWT signing pinned: ES256 over P-256, JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json,
5-minute relay cache.
- NIP-98 tags pinned: u / method / payload, base64 RFC 4648 standard
(not base64url).
- Error taxonomy: full HTTP status + `error` slug table for /auth, plus
WebTransport CONNECT 200/401/403/404 table.
EGG-03 (audio):
- Pin moq-lite Lite-03 to kixelated/moq-rs `rs/moq-lite/src/lite/`.
- One Opus packet per moq Frame (no container, no timestamp).
- Pubkey hex casing reaffirmed at the suffix / broadcast slots.
- AnnouncePlease prefix="" for speaker discovery.
- Mute = stop publishing (not silence frames, not Announce Ended).
- Mid-stream join: discard pre-skip per RFC 7845.
EGG-04 (presence):
- Heartbeat jitter ±5 s required (anti-thundering-herd).
- "0"/"1" are strings, not booleans.
- Single-room rule via replaceable-event semantics.
EGG-05 (chat): 8 KB suggested, 64 KB hard cap, 3 msg/s render rate.
EGG-06 (reactions): 30s window measured against created_at, drop-on-arrival
if already stale.
EGG-07 (moderation): replay protection — dedupe kicks by id within 120 s.
EGG-08 (scheduling): planned rooms MUST 403 at the auth sidecar.
EGG-10 (theming): bg image caps (1 MB / 4096 px soft, 8 MB / 8192 px hard).
Deferred (per review): EGG-00 (Conventions as a standalone spec), EGG-13
(capability advertisement), EGG-14 (discovery), test vectors corpus.
The "Conventions" section in README covers EGG-00's most urgent content
inline.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDpuki4t8StSg1CZcXnV5b
8.1 KiB
EGG-02: Auth & WebTransport handshake
status: draft
requires: EGG-01, NIP-98
category: required
Summary
To open the audio plane (EGG-03), a peer first proves identity to a per-room auth sidecar (moq-auth) using a NIP-98 HTTP signature, receives a short-lived JWT, then opens a WebTransport session against the moq-relay carrying the JWT in the URL.
Two separate URLs are involved: the service tag from EGG-01 is the auth
sidecar; the endpoint tag is the relay.
Wire format
Step 1 — token request
POST <service>/auth
Authorization: Nostr <base64(NIP-98 kind:27235 event JSON)>
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{ "namespace": "nests/<kind>:<host_pubkey_hex>:<room_d>",
"publish": <boolean> }
<kind> is 30312 for nests audio rooms (EGG-01).
The <service> URL is the EGG-01 service tag value with any trailing /
stripped, then /auth appended literally.
The body is a single-line UTF-8 JSON object — the server hashes the exact
bytes sent to compare against NIP-98's payload tag, so producers MUST
NOT pretty-print or re-order keys after signing.
The <host_pubkey_hex> is the host's pubkey, lowercase hex. The <room_d>
is the EGG-01 d tag (which by EGG-01 rule 9 cannot contain :, so the
namespace is unambiguous without escaping).
NIP-98 event shape
The signed kind 27235 event MUST carry exactly these tags (NIP-98 §1):
{
"kind": 27235,
"pubkey": "<requester pubkey hex>",
"created_at": <unix seconds>,
"tags": [
["u", "<service>/auth"], // exact request URL, scheme included
["method", "POST"],
["payload", "<sha256 of request body, lowercase hex>"]
],
"content": "",
"id": "<...>",
"sig": "<...>"
}
The event JSON is then serialized (NIP-01 canonical form), encoded as
RFC 4648 standard Base64 (NOT base64url; pad with =), prefixed with
Nostr (literal, including the trailing space), and placed in the
Authorization header.
Step 2 — token response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{ "token": "<jwt>" }
The JWT carries (at minimum):
| claim | meaning |
|---|---|
root |
The exact namespace echoed back. Authorisation is scoped here. |
get |
Read-allowed sub-paths; for nests this is [""] (any). |
put |
Publish-allowed sub-paths. For listeners: []. For speakers: [<own pubkey hex>]. |
iat |
Unix seconds; issuance. |
exp |
Unix seconds; expiry. MUST be iat + 600 for nests today. |
JWT signing
The JWT MUST be signed with alg: "ES256" (ECDSA on the NIST P-256 curve,
RFC 7518 §3.4). The auth sidecar MUST publish its public verification keys
as a JWKS at:
GET <service>/.well-known/jwks.json
The response is an application/json body shaped per RFC 7517:
{
"keys": [
{
"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "alg": "ES256",
"use": "sig", "kid": "<key id>",
"x": "<base64url x>", "y": "<base64url y>"
}
]
}
The relay (EGG-03 endpoint) MUST verify inbound JWTs against this JWKS. Relays SHOULD cache the JWKS for at most 5 minutes so a key rotation propagates without requiring a relay restart. A relay that cannot reach the JWKS endpoint MUST refuse new sessions rather than fall through to "trust the unverified token".
Step 3 — WebTransport CONNECT
:method = CONNECT
:protocol = webtransport
:scheme = https
:authority = <host:port from `endpoint`>
:path = /<namespace>?jwt=<token>
The relay reads the JWT from the ?jwt= query string. No Authorization
header is used at this step.
Behavior
- Listening peers MUST request
publish: false. Speaking peers MUST requestpublish: trueAND the JWT'sputclaim MUST list the speaker's own pubkey hex. - The auth sidecar's TLS certificate MUST be a publicly-trusted chain. The relay's TLS chain MAY be self-signed in development; production deployments MUST use a public chain.
- The auth sidecar SHOULD reject any request whose NIP-98
created_atis more than 60 s in the past or future. - The JWT lifetime is fixed at 600 s. There is no refresh endpoint. A client
that needs a longer session MUST mint a fresh token and open a new
WebTransport session before the old token expires; see the deployment-side
commentary in
nestsClient/plans/. - The relay MUST close the WebTransport session within 30 s of
exp. A peer receiving an unexpected close MUST be prepared to mint a fresh token and reconnect. - The relay MUST NOT trust the WebTransport authority for authorisation —
only the JWT's
rootclaim. A token issued for namespace A MUST NOT be accepted on a session opened against namespace B. - A peer MUST NOT log the JWT or include it in error reports. The token is a bearer credential.
Error taxonomy
The auth sidecar MUST use the following HTTP status codes for POST /auth.
Bodies are application/json and follow the shape
{ "error": "<machine slug>", "reason": "<human string>" }. Receivers
MAY ignore reason but MUST surface error to user-facing error toasts.
| status | error slug |
when |
|---|---|---|
| 200 | — | success; body is { "token": "<jwt>" } |
| 400 | bad_request |
malformed JSON body, missing namespace, unknown content-type |
| 400 | bad_namespace |
namespace does not match nests/<kind>:<hexpubkey>:<d> |
| 401 | bad_nip98 |
Authorization header missing, malformed, or id/sig invalid |
| 401 | wrong_url |
NIP-98 u tag does not match the actual request URL |
| 401 | wrong_method |
NIP-98 method tag is not POST |
| 401 | wrong_payload |
NIP-98 payload tag does not match sha256 of the body bytes |
| 401 | stale |
NIP-98 created_at outside the ±60 s tolerance |
| 403 | room_closed |
room status is closed (EGG-01) or planned (EGG-08) |
| 403 | not_invited |
room status is private and requester is not on the allowlist |
| 403 | publish_forbidden |
publish: true requested but caller is not a speaker per EGG-07 |
| 410 | unknown_room |
no kind:30312 known to the sidecar for (host, d) |
| 429 | rate_limited |
per-pubkey or per-IP rate limit; Retry-After header SHOULD be set |
| 5xx | internal |
sidecar internal error |
Receivers MUST treat unknown 4xx slugs as "fatal, do not retry" and unknown 5xx slugs as "transient, retry with exponential backoff".
The relay (EGG-03 endpoint) signals authorization failures through WebTransport CONNECT response codes, NOT through the auth-sidecar table:
| WT status | meaning |
|---|---|
| 200 | session established |
| 401 | JWT signature invalid, expired, or fails the JWKS check |
| 403 | JWT root does not match the path namespace, or put claim missing for a publishing peer |
| 404 | path namespace unknown to the relay |
Example
> POST https://moq.nostrnests.com/auth
> Authorization: Nostr eyJ...kind27235...
> Content-Type: application/json
>
> {"namespace":"nests/30312:abchost:office-hours-2026-04","publish":false}
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Content-Type: application/json
<
< {"token":"eyJhbGc..."}
> CONNECT :path=/nests/30312:abchost:office-hours-2026-04?jwt=eyJhbGc...
< 200 OK (WebTransport session established)
Compatibility
EGG-03 (audio plane) operates inside the WebTransport session this EGG opens. EGG-12 (catalog) shares the same session.