Files
amethyst/nestsClient/specs/EGG-02.md
T
Claude bd12d5ef72 docs(nestsClient/specs): close interop gaps surfaced in spec review
Edits across all 13 EGGs to remove implementer guesswork. After this an
implementer can build a listener and speaker without reading our source.

README:
- Conventions section: hex casing rule (lowercase, 64 chars, no 0x),
  NIP-01 foundations, `a`-tag form, created_at tie-break, JSON / time.
- Joining sequence: numbered end-to-end walkthrough from `kind:30312`
  to first audio frame, referencing each EGG.

EGG-01 (room event):
- `relays` tag is one tag with multiple values (not multi-tag).
- `service` URL trailing-slash normalization.
- `private` status: gate is implementation-defined, not "render as open".
- `d`-tag charset locked to [A-Za-z0-9._-] so it interpolates safely
  into the moq-auth namespace.
- Relay-discovery rule: publish to `relays` tag ∪ NIP-65 outbox.
- Tie-break on identical created_at via smallest event id.

EGG-02 (auth):
- JWT signing pinned: ES256 over P-256, JWKS at /.well-known/jwks.json,
  5-minute relay cache.
- NIP-98 tags pinned: u / method / payload, base64 RFC 4648 standard
  (not base64url).
- Error taxonomy: full HTTP status + `error` slug table for /auth, plus
  WebTransport CONNECT 200/401/403/404 table.

EGG-03 (audio):
- Pin moq-lite Lite-03 to kixelated/moq-rs `rs/moq-lite/src/lite/`.
- One Opus packet per moq Frame (no container, no timestamp).
- Pubkey hex casing reaffirmed at the suffix / broadcast slots.
- AnnouncePlease prefix="" for speaker discovery.
- Mute = stop publishing (not silence frames, not Announce Ended).
- Mid-stream join: discard pre-skip per RFC 7845.

EGG-04 (presence):
- Heartbeat jitter ±5 s required (anti-thundering-herd).
- "0"/"1" are strings, not booleans.
- Single-room rule via replaceable-event semantics.

EGG-05 (chat): 8 KB suggested, 64 KB hard cap, 3 msg/s render rate.
EGG-06 (reactions): 30s window measured against created_at, drop-on-arrival
                    if already stale.
EGG-07 (moderation): replay protection — dedupe kicks by id within 120 s.
EGG-08 (scheduling): planned rooms MUST 403 at the auth sidecar.
EGG-10 (theming): bg image caps (1 MB / 4096 px soft, 8 MB / 8192 px hard).

Deferred (per review): EGG-00 (Conventions as a standalone spec), EGG-13
(capability advertisement), EGG-14 (discovery), test vectors corpus.
The "Conventions" section in README covers EGG-00's most urgent content
inline.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDpuki4t8StSg1CZcXnV5b
2026-04-27 12:31:19 +00:00

212 lines
8.1 KiB
Markdown

# EGG-02: Auth & WebTransport handshake
`status: draft`
`requires: EGG-01, NIP-98`
`category: required`
## Summary
To open the audio plane (EGG-03), a peer first proves identity to a per-room
auth sidecar (moq-auth) using a NIP-98 HTTP signature, receives a short-lived
JWT, then opens a WebTransport session against the moq-relay carrying the JWT
in the URL.
Two separate URLs are involved: the `service` tag from EGG-01 is the auth
sidecar; the `endpoint` tag is the relay.
## Wire format
### Step 1 — token request
```
POST <service>/auth
Authorization: Nostr <base64(NIP-98 kind:27235 event JSON)>
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
{ "namespace": "nests/<kind>:<host_pubkey_hex>:<room_d>",
"publish": <boolean> }
```
`<kind>` is `30312` for nests audio rooms (EGG-01).
The `<service>` URL is the EGG-01 `service` tag value with any trailing `/`
stripped, then `/auth` appended literally.
The body is a single-line UTF-8 JSON object — the server hashes the **exact
bytes sent** to compare against NIP-98's `payload` tag, so producers MUST
NOT pretty-print or re-order keys after signing.
The `<host_pubkey_hex>` is the host's pubkey, lowercase hex. The `<room_d>`
is the EGG-01 `d` tag (which by EGG-01 rule 9 cannot contain `:`, so the
namespace is unambiguous without escaping).
#### NIP-98 event shape
The signed kind 27235 event MUST carry exactly these tags (NIP-98 §1):
```json
{
"kind": 27235,
"pubkey": "<requester pubkey hex>",
"created_at": <unix seconds>,
"tags": [
["u", "<service>/auth"], // exact request URL, scheme included
["method", "POST"],
["payload", "<sha256 of request body, lowercase hex>"]
],
"content": "",
"id": "<...>",
"sig": "<...>"
}
```
The event JSON is then serialized (NIP-01 canonical form), encoded as
**RFC 4648 standard Base64** (NOT base64url; pad with `=`), prefixed with
`Nostr ` (literal, including the trailing space), and placed in the
`Authorization` header.
### Step 2 — token response
```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{ "token": "<jwt>" }
```
The JWT carries (at minimum):
| claim | meaning |
|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| `root` | The exact `namespace` echoed back. Authorisation is scoped here. |
| `get` | Read-allowed sub-paths; for nests this is `[""]` (any). |
| `put` | Publish-allowed sub-paths. For listeners: `[]`. For speakers: `[<own pubkey hex>]`. |
| `iat` | Unix seconds; issuance. |
| `exp` | Unix seconds; expiry. MUST be `iat + 600` for nests today. |
#### JWT signing
The JWT MUST be signed with `alg: "ES256"` (ECDSA on the NIST P-256 curve,
RFC 7518 §3.4). The auth sidecar MUST publish its public verification keys
as a JWKS at:
```
GET <service>/.well-known/jwks.json
```
The response is an `application/json` body shaped per RFC 7517:
```json
{
"keys": [
{
"kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", "alg": "ES256",
"use": "sig", "kid": "<key id>",
"x": "<base64url x>", "y": "<base64url y>"
}
]
}
```
The relay (EGG-03 endpoint) MUST verify inbound JWTs against this JWKS.
Relays SHOULD cache the JWKS for at most 5 minutes so a key rotation
propagates without requiring a relay restart. A relay that cannot reach
the JWKS endpoint MUST refuse new sessions rather than fall through to
"trust the unverified token".
### Step 3 — WebTransport CONNECT
```
:method = CONNECT
:protocol = webtransport
:scheme = https
:authority = <host:port from `endpoint`>
:path = /<namespace>?jwt=<token>
```
The relay reads the JWT from the `?jwt=` query string. No `Authorization`
header is used at this step.
## Behavior
1. Listening peers MUST request `publish: false`. Speaking peers MUST request
`publish: true` AND the JWT's `put` claim MUST list the speaker's own
pubkey hex.
2. The auth sidecar's TLS certificate MUST be a publicly-trusted chain. The
relay's TLS chain MAY be self-signed in development; production deployments
MUST use a public chain.
3. The auth sidecar SHOULD reject any request whose NIP-98 `created_at` is
more than 60 s in the past or future.
4. The JWT lifetime is fixed at 600 s. There is no refresh endpoint. A client
that needs a longer session MUST mint a fresh token and open a new
WebTransport session before the old token expires; see the deployment-side
commentary in `nestsClient/plans/`.
5. The relay MUST close the WebTransport session within 30 s of `exp`. A peer
receiving an unexpected close MUST be prepared to mint a fresh token and
reconnect.
6. The relay MUST NOT trust the WebTransport authority for authorisation —
only the JWT's `root` claim. A token issued for namespace A MUST NOT be
accepted on a session opened against namespace B.
7. A peer MUST NOT log the JWT or include it in error reports. The token is a
bearer credential.
## Error taxonomy
The auth sidecar MUST use the following HTTP status codes for `POST /auth`.
Bodies are `application/json` and follow the shape
`{ "error": "<machine slug>", "reason": "<human string>" }`. Receivers
MAY ignore `reason` but MUST surface `error` to user-facing error toasts.
| status | `error` slug | when |
|--------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 200 | — | success; body is `{ "token": "<jwt>" }` |
| 400 | `bad_request` | malformed JSON body, missing `namespace`, unknown content-type |
| 400 | `bad_namespace` | namespace does not match `nests/<kind>:<hexpubkey>:<d>` |
| 401 | `bad_nip98` | Authorization header missing, malformed, or `id`/`sig` invalid |
| 401 | `wrong_url` | NIP-98 `u` tag does not match the actual request URL |
| 401 | `wrong_method` | NIP-98 `method` tag is not `POST` |
| 401 | `wrong_payload` | NIP-98 `payload` tag does not match sha256 of the body bytes |
| 401 | `stale` | NIP-98 `created_at` outside the ±60 s tolerance |
| 403 | `room_closed` | room status is `closed` (EGG-01) or `planned` (EGG-08) |
| 403 | `not_invited` | room status is `private` and requester is not on the allowlist |
| 403 | `publish_forbidden` | `publish: true` requested but caller is not a speaker per EGG-07 |
| 410 | `unknown_room` | no `kind:30312` known to the sidecar for `(host, d)` |
| 429 | `rate_limited` | per-pubkey or per-IP rate limit; `Retry-After` header SHOULD be set |
| 5xx | `internal` | sidecar internal error |
Receivers MUST treat unknown 4xx slugs as "fatal, do not retry" and
unknown 5xx slugs as "transient, retry with exponential backoff".
The relay (EGG-03 endpoint) signals authorization failures through
WebTransport CONNECT response codes, NOT through the auth-sidecar table:
| WT status | meaning |
|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 200 | session established |
| 401 | JWT signature invalid, expired, or fails the JWKS check |
| 403 | JWT `root` does not match the path namespace, or `put` claim missing for a publishing peer |
| 404 | path namespace unknown to the relay |
## Example
```
> POST https://moq.nostrnests.com/auth
> Authorization: Nostr eyJ...kind27235...
> Content-Type: application/json
>
> {"namespace":"nests/30312:abchost:office-hours-2026-04","publish":false}
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Content-Type: application/json
<
< {"token":"eyJhbGc..."}
> CONNECT :path=/nests/30312:abchost:office-hours-2026-04?jwt=eyJhbGc...
< 200 OK (WebTransport session established)
```
## Compatibility
EGG-03 (audio plane) operates inside the WebTransport session this EGG opens.
EGG-12 (catalog) shares the same session.